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Along with the industrial revolution have come many: materia.l 
benefits, as well as detrim~nts. Though the former ~~ve far over-
shadowed the latter, there is no reason why we as a nation or as in-
dividuals should disregard thes~ latter developments, for to conquer 
them is another step toward progr9ss. Past history has shown. that we 
have not neglected the ills of industrialization and consequent urbaniza-
tion, though in some instances action has been slow in coming. 
One of these problems is of a combined sociological and eco-
nomic nature. Though great strides forward have been made, ther~ still 
remain some aspects that deserve consideration. Specifically I am 
thinking of the superannuated employee. It is not a . probl9m that has 
come at us overnight, but it is one that we might have begun looking at 
sooner than we did. Not every person can be as economically successful 
as the next one, because of unequal mental and physical prowess, or ill 
fortune not brought about by the individual himself. Consequently when 
an employee reaches the age when senility encroaches on his productivity, 
and he is forced to retire, he may or may not be prepared for it. Thus, 
though part of the populace may have earned sufficient income to have 
provided for later life, they may not have had proper wisdom or training 
in expending this income and consequently never bull t up a fund for 
retirement. On the other hand there are some individuals who never 
would be able to build a fUnd because of the inadequaey of their income. 
This latter group needs the assistance that employer contributions and 
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social security can bring them. C. R. Henderson in his article in 
Harvard Busin~ss Review states this most clearly from a public point 
of view. nA pension plan is better because its compulsory nature pro-
tects society from the possible improvidence of an individual, which 
might leave society faced with a choice of letter a person starve in 
his o;Ld age or giving him money he did not eam." . 
It was only with th~ socio-economic revolution of the 
thirties that action was taken on the part of the Federal Goven1ment. 
It was just a beginning, however, and even in this last election the 
Republicans made much of the issue to broaden the range of social 
security. In this same decade, but especially with the advent of war, 
private business interest in the problem of worker-security in old age 
took on a new impetus. It was not so much from altruistic motives per-
haps, but rather out of economic necessity. On the one hand, the thirties 
were a period of intense unionization, aided and abetted by the Wagner 
Labor Relations Act of 1955, and fringe benefits of the pension type 
have become popular demands of these unions. On the other hand, the 
war period, with its ceilings on wages and prices, and scarcity of labor, 
led management to offer these benefits to labor as an inducement to leave 
their former employers. 
I would propose something more, however, than dollar security. 
The development of pension funds till very recently has been along the 
lines of providing only a guaranteed dollar income upon retirement, with-
out sufficient regard for very evident facts which face us every day of 
the year, namely fluctuations in the purehasing power of this dollar. 
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Funds hav13 been traditionally placed in high-grade debt s-acuri ties, with 
only occasional instances of more risky and consequently higher-yielding 
securities. Could it be that the risk has been overemphasized at the ex-
pense of yield? Are those who have had the duty of investing pension 
funds been afraid to gamble with the future security of th9 pension re-
cipients? It is my opinion, and I am not alone, that risks can b'! mini-
mized, that yields are a very important fact to consider, and that it is 
when the pensioner is guaranteed only a stable .dollar incom~ that gambling 
is t nvolved. These are factors that I wish to point out in this thesis 
and along with them, ways that they may be overcome. The principal weapon 
I propose is greater use of equity securities. 
We can be proud of public and private progress in providing 
for worker security. It is one of our strong weapons against Communism, 
for it is discontent and insecurity that feed this monster whose claws 
reach out from Moscow in all directions. Those ultra-conservatives who 
shout creeping socialism or some other slogan of a derogatory nature 
against the progress that has been made in old age security, in so far 
as they slow down this progress are but helping to dig the grave of the 
economic system they uphold so devoutly. 
As I stated previously, it has only been recently that trustees, 
investment counselors, and other interested parties have begun to change 
their attitude on the place of equity securities in a pension fund portfolio. 
I therefore have not come across much in the way of printed matter on this 
topic. A. J. Ostheimer,_ in his pamphlet "The Caae lor .Insured P9nsion 
P~ans" did acknowledge that private trustee plans could claim higher yi91ds 
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but did not go into the method whereby they were brought about. There 
are many books, monograms and pamphlets that deal with pensions and 
afford excellent background material, but discussion of the investment 
of the funds is conspicuously absent. It was in the National Planning 
Association Report To The 82nd Congress, R. M. Ball, director, that a 
suggestion was made that to use more equity fUnds in pensions, is a field 
that is still open for development. Reference was made to the forth-
coming booklet "A New Approach To Retirement Income" written by 
W. C. Greenough for the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association 
of America. I have found this source most valuable, as well as 
R. C. Henderson's "A Better Pension Program." Both advocate the use 
of a combination of fixed-dollar pension as a base and a subsidiary 
equity fUnd to provide for fluctuations in the price level. 
I plan to present my case in the logical sequenc,e of first 
offering an introduction into the field, looking at what has be~n done 
in the way of coverage and what still remains to be done. I next wish 
to present the pattern of pensions as they now exist, including the 
case for formal versus inf ormal plans and insured versus uninsured plans. 
This latter step will lead into the place equities should have in pension 
plan investments. I will point out how the risk factors of equity 
securities can be minimized, and how they can definitely help to aug-
ment a pension income. By exploring the past history of stock priees, 
yields, and the cost of living, I hope to put my point across. In con-
clusion, I will point out how the problem of real dollar versus absolute 
retirement benefits has been compromised through the unit annuity idea. 
Yi11 
CHAPTER I 
THE MEANING OF PENSIONS 
Before delviag into the problems and proposals conc~rning 
the new outlook toward pension funds, I wish to point out just what 
is meant by a pension, and what is hoped to be gained through them. 
The reader should also be acquainted with the origin of pensions, their 
past records, and their future. 
In the literal sense, a pension is nothing mor9 than a sub-
sidy, a gratuity, to be paid to an individual upon completion of a 
number of years of faithfUl service. In this sense a pension is but 
a favor granted by th~ payer to the payee. It carries ~~th it the 
connotation of turning a man out to pasture as we would do with a 
favorite old horse. It expresses the feeling that you have done a 
good job, but now we no longer need you. He~o is a pittance we will 
pay you until you die. This is not the way to look at pensions; it 
is certainly not the way I consider them. A pension should not be 
looked upon as a favor, a subsidy, or the like, with the connota.tions 
such words carry. It should be looked upon, rather, as a deferred 
payment of wages earned, a retirement program, whereby the worker upon 
reaching a certain age, will begin to receive the payments formerly 
withheld. Pensions are a part of the cost of labor and are charged 
against earnings as much as wag<:'!S and salaries. Wi:dmess. The ann m1.. 
report of American Telephone & Telegraph, or any company offering a 
pension plan. It may seem strange, but there are people today that 
deplore the use of pensions, and an example is Paul I. Po:ri·ot in his 
pamphlet, The Pension Idea.* During th~ last war many firms insti-
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tuted pension plans in order to give workers higher pay without ex-
ceeding the allowed maximum. The pensions thus offered were, in fact, 
wages to be paid in the future instBad of in the present. 
When regarding pensions as a compensation for work done, 
rather than a grant or subsidy, it is not too difficult to see how some 
people h.a.v·e begun to eonsid"3r the adequacy of these paJ'1Tl'3nts. A man 
working at the same trade now as in 1959 is not earning the same wage, 
yet the man who retired at that time is. lf we are to look at pensions 
as something the worker has earned a right to, we should also see to it 
that these payments maintain a stable purchasing power. Later I will 
further develop this idea. 
Why pay pensions? Why not pass the fUture payments on to the 
worker today? It would certainly be less expensive than maintaining a 
pension fund, and perhaps the workers might r ather have the money now. 
The reasons are simple and not hard to find. The worker, though he might 
desirs more money now, in the long run would not want to lose hf s pension 
in order to receive a larger pay cheek today. 
The Research Institute of America in their pamphlet, D~idjng 
Your PoliQZ QD. E§.nsi,Qp_§,, pointed out emphatically the value of assuring 
a r ".!tirement income. It creates a new opportunity rather than a mere 
existence until death. "The improvement of income maintenance arrange-
ments is, ther~fore, perhaps the most important single aspect of the 
movement to make life worth living for the retired aged .. " 
Pension plans to the worker are the same a s syst«:!matic savings, 
and give an unequalled feeling of security. This is not to say that 
savings shoul d not be encouraged as a source of future income, but quite 
th~ contrary. The worker should be encouraged to sav~, and might be 
more inclined to do so when a pension can act as a base upon which to 
build. Of course it must be admitted, on the other hand, that to the 
extent that the assurance of a pension makes individuals less concerned 
with the problem of r~tirement income, the level personal s~ings might 
well be reduced. In the period since World War II began, we have seen 
a grea t rise in the level of personal savings. This has also been a 
period of rapid growth for pension programs. To what extent the correla-
tion is significant is debatable and the answ8r requires much detailed 
study. Thert?- are many factors that could push up the level of savings. 
The most notable is naturally the high level of economic activity and t he 
consequent high level of earnings paid to American Labor. Also during 
the war there was the factor of shortages and lack of goods upon which 
to expend this income. As we emerged from the war much of the s'3 savings 
were spent on things not available previously. The pc:lriod of the 19501 s, 
ho~ver, has again seen an increase in personal savings, due still to high 
incomes, but this time there were no shortages involved. The Federal Gov-
ernment right now would like to see more of it spent, yet people continue 
to save. I do not mean to infer that it is the growth in pensions that has 
stimulated this level of savings. .A good explanation might be that people 
are merely trying to build up som9 securit,r for the short run, something 
to carry them over any hurdles this "rolling adjustment" we are going 
through might present to them. This certainly is a plausible answer; per-
haps it is the answer. 
At the present time savings alone cannot be relied upon. This 
was pointc:,d out quite clearly by the Federal Reserve Board in a survey they 
conducted in 1951. Their figures indicate that 7/10 of the heads of 
families had less than $2,000 in savings other than their o;m homes. This 
proportion was about the same for those over 65. Furthermore, to buy an 
annuity after the age of 65, would cost a man $11,900 for a monthly in-
come of $75.* This is a difficult goal for many wage earners to attain, 
because as the pay check arrives each week, it is all too easy to find a 
hundred and one necessities upon which to expend this income. 
The Federal Government has tried to alleviate this inadequacy 
of private savings. The help that it has given is noteworthy. I feel, 
however, that whenever and wherever ·possible, this assistance should be 
primarily the task of private p'3llsion plans. It is my conviction that 
wherever and whenever an activity can be carried on efficiently and ade-
quately by private interests, Government should encourage it, and give 
it free reign, but not try to duplicate it. If private interests do not 
take on the t ask of administering retirement programs, I feel the need 
is great enough and the Government in that case should fill the gap. The 
need was pres'3nt in the thirties, '.and to the extent that subsequent coverage 
included workers not in a private plan the need was also presBnt. We now 
have a Federal · Social Security program that is just &,bout all inclusive. 
The major part of our private plans have grown up since this Federal pro-
gr~m was started, and the,r have used the latter as a base. Therefore, 
I would not advocate abandonment of the Federal program in that it would 
disrupt our present private programs. I, however, would not like to see 
Social Security expanded to anythi ng more elaborate than a base, becaus13 
the only outcome I can forsee for greater government int~rvention in this 
field is paternalism. We are even now all too quick to turn to the Federal 
*17, p. a. 
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government the moment any adversity comes along. Witness the f armers, the 
tariff advocates and oth~r pressur9 groups in Washington. The mar~ govern-
ment steps into our every day lives, the less aggressive and dynamic we 
have to be, to be successful, and we will lose our vitality and resource-
fulness as a nation. 
It is not only the recipient, ho~ver, who stands to gain from 
pensions, but also the company itself realizes advantages. When the plans 
incl ude t he management personnel, pension plans tend to bring fresh ideas 
to the fore by enabling younger workers to movg up the l adder. Pensions 
are also an orderly method of retiring older employees who have passed their 
peak efficiency. On t he other hand, pension plans help to stabilize the 
work force . A worker is not apt to shop around so quickly for another job, 
if he has built up more long-term f inancial security. Some writers object 
and claim that benefits should be fully vested with the employee at all 
times in order to avoid such pressure. There is room for argument here, 
since economics would argue that our productive efforts shoul d be directed 
toward those activities that yield us the greatest gai n and in t his way 
the grea t est possible good for the economy as a whole. This goes for all 
the factors of production: Land labor and Capital. To the extent then 
that the worker loses his mobility, the economy in the long run woul d be 
a net loser. The fact still remains, however, that a low l abor turnover 
is a cost reducing factor t o the individual business. In so far as costs 
are reduced the economy gains. The question remains, which offers the 
greatest gain to th~ economy. I am inclined to believe that pensions should 
be fully vested and that they shoul d not be allowed to hinder the mobility 
of labor, and i n this way w~ will rgceive the greatest gain. The concept 
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of fully ve~ted pensions is also more consistent with my vi9w that 
pensions are in effe.ct a. deferred wage, for accrued wages once earned 
are not lost to th~ worker should he change his job. But we must re-
member, the immediate effect of l~bor turnover is of concern to the 
management of a going business, and as I stated above, to the ext'3Ilt 
that it is reduced the labor costs of the business are reduced. One 
last benefit I wish to mention is the potential productivit1 increase 
that might evolve as the worker feels a greater sense of security and 
can better attend to the job at hand.* 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
*5, p. 5. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FtJTURE 
Now I wish to consider the development and the future potenti-
alit1 of these pension programs, commencing with a brief sketch of their 
history her~ in the United S~~tes. 
The American Express Company is credited with inaugurating the 
first pension plan in 1875. Their immediate development was not in the 
least significant, but by the tum of the century the idea had caught hold 
in several of the larger corporations. In 1892 Consolidated &dison of 
New York (at that time called Consolidated &.s Company) ini"l:;ia.ted a. plan, 
and Standard Oil and Carnegie Steel follow~d suit sev~ral years later. 
These early plans were unfUnded, non-contributory, and avoided establish-
ing rights.* 
For the next thirty-five years, new plans continued to arise, 
but the rate of. growth allowed only about six million persons to be covered. 
The degr9e of coverage also, varied widely through the society. Communica-
tions was one hundred percent covered, while retail trade and farmers bad 
no coverage at all. To break it down a little differently, employers 
spon·sored plans covered 5. 7 million, and the government plans around 
another 2 million~ The remainder of the p~ans were for the most part, 
union plans, and plans cov<:!rlng some 200,000 teachers and clergymen.** 
The period of the thirties was one of marked social changes. 
One of those changes was a very marked incr~ase i n persons covered. In 
1950 there were some 720 private plans covering about 2.4 million persons, 
·------------~------------ .. . ___ , _______ _ 
*1:1 , p. 11. . 
**17, P• 10. 
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'yet by the end of the decade, in 1940, there existed roughly 2,000 plans 
which cov~red almost 4 mill ion persons.* The big jump occurred, of course, 
in the realm of public plans. In 1957, 25 million persons cam~ under the 
Federal Old Age Survivors Insurance program.** The ramifications of this 
great step was of major significance in the realm of private p~sion plans, 
in that it was one of the reasons for their aforementioned growth. Ac-
cording to a report by t he Federal Reserve Bank of Ne\v York, 11 This legis-
lation greatly increased employ~r and employee interest in, and conscious-
ness of, the desirabilit,y of providing, through advance financing, for 
the economic hazards ·or old age.*** 
The last World War gave even more impetus to this movement. 
This impetus was due more to economic reasons than to the development of 
a greater social consciousness and to the new economic philosophy that 
gave us the push in the thirties. The war was a period of heavy taxes, 
and labor shortages. Especially as the war progressed, it was not possible 
to lure labor to the plant by means of higher wages, because there were 
tight controls imposed by the government. Fringe benefits were the order 
of the day, and they could be carried with no real burden by business. 
Just as wages are an expense of doing business and ar8 consequently deduct-
ible for income tax purposes, so too are pension contributions, if the 
plan they are paid into qualifies with Treasury Depar~~ent regulations.# 
The tighter the labor market became, the more liberal and numerous these 
private plans became. At twenty eents on the dolla~ch is about all 
/ITo be explained in Chapter III 
*18, p. 186. 
**17, P• 10. 
*** 18, p. 185. 
****17, p. 11. 
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~t cost a company subject to the excess profits tax, how could a company 
lose? At the time, it could not, yet the future might just prove that some 
of them ar~ too expensive. 
A look a.t the figures shows us that the number of private plans 
grew to 7,400, whil e the number of workers covered rose to 5.5 million.* 
In addition, there was an ever increasing number of people covered by the 
Federal Government's OASI. 
These two trends, however, were the result of different reasons. 
In the first case, we had a l arge number of new plans, whereas, in the 
second case, the growth represent~d a shift into industries and occupations 
that were covered under OASI from those that were not. Consid~ring private 
plans, it is also interesting to note the large number of new plans as con-
trasted to the number of persons covered. One reason might be that many 
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of the plans were for those holding more responsible jobs, whereas previous-
ly they had been relatively neglected. Also, our population was very transi-
~ory at the time, and often a wonker did not stay at a job long enough to 
become eligible. Finally, there were many smaller companies initiating 
plans in order to better compete in the labor market. 
The post war era did not see th'3 end of this growth movement 
in either the field of private or of public pensions. Continued high 
taxes and increased union power put pressure on industry to continue the 
movement, while the Federal Government continued to broad~n its coverage. 
The union pressure received extra momentum when, in 1949, a Rational 
Labor Relations Board ruled that pensions were an •appropriate subject 
*18, p. 186. 
, for collective bargaining."* Other motivating influenc'!S might have been 
a continuance of the social consciousness theme, and in the case of super-
visory personnel; a way of avoiding taxes. 
The reasons are somewhat difficult to pinpoint exactly, though 
the above are the generally accepted ones. The statistics, however, point 
out more vividly the tremendous growth that has taken place in the public 
and privat e sphere. In the six years aft~r World War II private plans had 
grown some 6,800 in number and came to cover over 9.5 million people or 
more than 5 million more persons than in 1945.** 
T!f!LE! 
Estim&ted Number of Private Pension Plans 
and Number of Persons .Covered 
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Thus, in six years as much was accomplished in private pension cov9rage as 
in the previous sevent7 years. Figures beyond 1951 are still estimates, but 
*18, p. 186. 
**18, p. 186. 
it is figured that some 1,500 new plans have been ~dopted, and the total 
cov~rage is about ten to eleven million. This number is small, of course, 
next to the sixty-six million covered by the Federal Government, and the 
seven and one-half million covered by local, state, or other governmental 
programs.* 
Members of the working force today are covered someho~,either 
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by Fed~ral, by other governmental, or by private plans. The latter group, 
for the most part, are plans that overlap OASI, and those covered by both 
plans are naturally better. Governmental plans are based on a mere sub-
sistence level, therefore the private plans plus personal savings are 
necessary for the individual to rise above such a basic minimum. The posi-
t tion of each of these sources of income . may be graphically shown as a. 
triangle.* 
Chart I 
The Retirement Triangle 
- . 
·f 0 ~MJO'( 0.. ~tUI OF- ilt« 
Ther~ is no one organization th,"l.t coll~cts complete and accura te figures 
on this score, but it is estimated that the total is increasing, at the rate 
of 2-2~ billion dollars per y~ar, with the total at the end of last year 
around $17.0 billion.** Another source would indicate that this figure 
might be a bit high. $14.0 billion*** is more nearly correct. Just which 
*4, p. 12 • 
. **18, p. 187. 
***17, p. 20. 
it is, it is impossible to tell, but the truth is probably somewher9 in 
between. The present rate of growth of these private pension funds is 
equal to about 1/5 of the annual net growth of savings at banks and insur-
ance companies, which are the two prime savings institutions. This dollar 
growth naturally followed the ~xpansion of cov~rage, but was accelerated 
by the fact that when plans are first initiated some past funding is 
12 
carried on for the first five to ten years. In addition, the funds have not 
h.~.d to face any heavy withdrawals because of the relative youthfulness of 
so many of them. 
Most of the funds that are being collected under these pension 
agre9ments, hav9 been go~ into the uninsured category. As can be seen 
from Table I, the insured plans generally cover the smaller firms with an 
overall cover~ge of 269.16 persons per plan, whereas, th'9 uninsured plans 
include 3,520.63 per plan in 1951. Even among the insured plans, the group-
annuity type, used in the larger business organizations, account~d for the 
largest part of the gain made by insurance companies.* 
This brings us up to date, but what of the future? Will the in-
crease continue? Can w~ af ford to let it continue? I think in both cases 
the answer is yes, · but let us look mor~ closely. 
"The most dynamic phase of the growth of pension funds has probably 
been reached, or will be reached in the next few years."** This is the 
Opinion of a very reliable source. They point out how the very large cor-
porations, th~ ones that can most easily afford to carry a pension program, 
have by and l arge been the ones that h3.V'3 undertaken these plans, and thus 
----------------~- ·-------~------------~-----------·---------------~ *18, p . 187. 
**18, p. 188. 
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· the potential has to some extent been used up. O:f course, there are the 
numerous smaller firms to figure on, but many of them at this time might 
not be able to af ford it. I fgel that one of the major det9rminants to 
further growth at this time, is the uncertainty of future business condi-
tions. To undertake such a major project as the installation of a pension 
program, in the f ace of a decline in business, could prove to be financial 
suicide. 
Both of the above factors a r e operative, how9ver, and have an 
offsetting effect on those that might tend to incr ease the number of plans 
L~ effect. It is not only the number of plans, however, that might well 
decrease in growth int~sity, but also the volume of funds. As maintained 
previously, past funding helps feed more into the kitty, than can be figured 
on in the long run. The tapering off of this factor, combined with a gradual 
maturing of the plans, will tend to hold dovm the growth of t he vol ume of 
funds. I r the f actors mentioned in the previous paragraph are added to 
this, it is not difficult to see why growth should not prove to be notably 
contained for the next several years. 
On the other hand there are pressures that are continually being 
put to bear to expand retirement plans. The biggest pressure will be the 
unions. It is something they can bargain for and tills tie the worker even 
more closely to the union. It sort of enables them to build up loyalty. Even 
this force, ho\'rever, cannot go against a sharp decline in business. 
In the long run, however, becau se of the growth curve of our 
economy and our exp!lllding population, pensions can be expected to expand 
so that njust as in the case of life insurance, accumulation of pension 
fUnds may continue indefinit~ly.n* 
-ltTB, p. rss- · -~--------------~-----
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The ~uestion might be asked at this point, can we afford to carry 
on further dev~lopment of pensions, or should we perhaps encourage people 
to stay on the job until an older age? We ar~ all dependent on the success 
that industry and business in gen~ral has in producing a flovr of goods and 
s~rvices. This flow of goods and services must meet not only the demands 
of those who assist in this flow, but also of those who are too young or 
too old to take an active part. Thus, when we consider pensions and their 
provisions, there are t wo economic factors to consider: production and in-
stitutional arrangements for income maintenance.* The level of production 
determines the volume of goods and services available, and the level of 
provisions for old age retirement will have an effect on the level of pro-
duction. Although pensions might be justified on sociological grounds alone, 
when thinking in terms of our capitalistic economic system, it is well to 
remember that "it is desirable to keep any factors which inhibit production 
to a minimum, and to promote factors which are favorable to a large volume 
of goods and services."** 
Some people might argue that our standard of living is threatened 
by the increased number of aged in our nation, and that anything we can do to 
keep them in the labor force, the better off we will be. In a situation of 
full employment there would be a net decrease in productivity by the amount 
of the productivity of ~hose workers forced to retire. This reasoning, of 
course, must assume a stagnation of technological development, which in fact 
is not the case. Also, to assume that full employment is normal is not realis-
tic. It is what we strive to attain, but over the years it is not approached. 
----~----------------~----------------------·-----------------------------*17' p. 59. 
**17, p. :39. 
In th~ past, our productivity has shown a steadily rising trend. Also, 
ov~r th~ past t wo decades, we havg seen a decrease of approximately one 
hundred fifty non-workers p~r one hundred workers, to one hundr~d thirty-
five per hundred.* Thus we hav~ put a larger p~rcent of our population 
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to work ~nd increased th~ productivity of each member of this vork force. 
If both trgnds continue, we can not only expect to maintain our standard 
of l iving but also increase it. Our standard of living is under no strain 
because of th~ growth of pensions, and should it ever be, our productivity 
incr eases would soon enable us to carry the burden. Furthermore if pay-
ments out of pensions ar':) allov;ed to nuctuate with the fortun'3s of the 
economy, therP. would be no danger of them having a depressing effect on 
the economy. This noint is discussed further in the latter sections of this 
Deport. 
One l ast consideration on this development of pensions, and that 
is, their effect on saving and s~ending. Are pension funds new savings 
or diverted savings? Are they a steady source of savings? The answers 
to these questions ar~ more a matter of opinion than cold hard facts. fte 
answers in the first cases must be qualified with 11 ifs" and in the second 
case, a real business recession would give us the answer. 
First of all, are pensions new savings or savings diverted into 
a new channel? It is necessary to consider employee contributions separate-
ly. In the case of the former, to th'3 extent that th~ would fail to make 
adequate provision for old age, pension contributions represent savings 
that otherwise would h~ve be~n spent. Savings for emergencies would probably 
not be r educed, but when pensions are initiated it is possible that individu-
------------------·-------------------------------·--~-----*17, p. 41. 
als become less aoncerned with the problem of old age, and reduce savings 
' 
for this purpose. Pension contributions covering this latter amount are 
diverted savings.* Most p~rsons however would fail to make adequate 
proVision for old age and therefore employ9e contributions are for the most 
part new savings, rather than savings diverted from other sources toward 
pension funds.**' 
Concerning corporate contributions the incidence on spending 
and consumption*** is impossible to trace. On the one hand, pension con-
tribution might be passed on to the consumer via higher prices, in this 
inst3nce they would be forced savings or new savings as we have called 
them. Yet on the accounting stat9mr:lnt, they are deductions in earnings, 
income taxes, and dividends. If this is the case, pension contributions 
would be a form of diverted savings. This fact would result in greater 
need for external financing on the part of the corporation. Which is the 
answer, cannot be generalized on. 
The best that can be said is that ftcorporate contributions to 
pension funds represent in part a source or new savings and in part a 
shift in the form of savings."**** 
What is the stability of these funds as an expression of savings? 
Contributions may vary, according to fluctuations in employment, funding 
of past service liabilities, aggregate benefit payments, and finally in 
the ability of employers to meet the obligations in slack times.•~MlK 
A large part of the plans cover the more highly paid worker 
*18, p. 186. 
**18, p. 186. 
***18, p. 186. 
****18, p. 186. 
*****18, p. 186. 
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vwhos~ job is also more stable. The newer plans, however, do not all follow 
t his pattern. During slack times, not only are som~ workers laid off, but 
many may suddenly t._q_ke advantage of their pension coverage, so that there 
may be a net decr~ase in payment~ coming in, over those going out. For 
example, American Telephone & Telegraph system has 52,728 persons receiv-
ing benefits from its pension program but there are also right now 21,000 
more employee eligible for pensions, who are still on the payroll.* 
The ability of the employer to we·1 ther eeonomie stoms will also h9.ve an 
effect on the accumulations to these funds. By and large, it has been the 
sounder corporations that have t 9.."k en on these p9Ilsion plans, and thus to 
the ext•.mt that they malce up the bulk of the payments and 11 that efforts to 
stabilize employment are succ'3ssful, and to the extent that private pensions 
cover the relatively stable white collar and executive occupations, it ap-
oears pension contributions are likely to be a relatively stable form of 
savings, perhaps more so than availability of priv.9.te investm'3nt opporutni-
ti'3s."** This idea, tha t the supply of savings is possibly more assured 
than the demand for capital is also expressed by Dr. Marcus Nadl'3r in a 
recent article in Trusts and Estates.*** He pointed out the various f orms 
tha t our sav-lngs take such as liquid personal savings, repayment of eon-
sumer d~h~, :corporate depreciation eb..-:J.rges, sinking fund redemptions of 
bonds, and contract ne.t savings. In this latter group are such items as 
Life Insurance and Pension Funds. Nadler h;1.d this to say about our national 
savings picture: "Thus our capacity to save is great and except in periods 
~--------------------·--------------------------~-------------------------*11, p. 22 
**18, p. 187. 
***15, PP• 122-126. 
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1 when business ac'Givity is very high and gov~rnment is op<:lra.ting at a 
deficit, the supply of funds seeking an outlet is usually as great and 
often greater than the demand for n~w capital.n* 
Dr. Nadler was of course speaking of savings in g9Ileral and 
we are here concerned mor-e with th~ amounts paid into P~nsion Funds. ~t 
present they to~~l only $17 billion, as compared with $504 billion in 
life insursnce, but they have not been a factor nearly as long as the 
latt~r. The pres~t annual increment in pension funds amounts to approxi-
mately $2-2f billion, and as Dr. Douglas Bellemare points out in his arti-
el~B of March 1954,**" this amounts to about 1/5 of the savings of all finan-
cial institutions, exclusive of pension funds administered by the life in-
sur.snce companies. 
In conclusion it may be said that savings could possibly become 
a more stable factor than new investmgnt opportunity and since contractual 
savings are more stable than voluntary personal savings as the 19501 s will 
attest, pension funds probably will continue to offer a steady fund of 
savings. Provisions of 165a of our Tax Laws also act to keep the funds 
flowing since tax liability would b9 incurred upon cessation of payments. 
That pension payments could become a burden to a particular ~mployer, or 
that some plans may be forced out of existence is not denied, but this does 
not affect the validity of the argument. 
In the next few chapters I will present the present pattern of 
pensions and what is to be said for and against them. This study will, in 
turn, lead us to what I consider the major weakness of them all. 
*15, p. 125. 
**14, p. 267. 
CfiAPT&R III 
THE PRESENT PATTERN OF PENSIONS 
Until now I have mad~ no attempt to differentiate between the 
various forms of private pensions as they exist today. But they are many 
and at this point I wish to givl3 a brief description of them. Funda-
m~ntally they are of two varieti13s; formal and informal, with a hybrid semi-
formal that is found on occasion. A formal plan is one that is eligible 
under section 165, of the Int~rnal Revenue code. They may not discriminate 
in f avor of any individual or small group of employees.* Furthermore formal 
plans ar~ generally eonsider~d those that are actuarially sound. They are 
completely f'und~d, or will be within the first ten or twenty ye~rs after 
their initiation. This latter qualification is the prime distinction be-
tween formal and other plans. 
The Sf9mi-forma.l and informal plans, in contrast to formal plans, 
do not attempt to be actuarially sound, though they may or may not be quali-
fied und~r section 165a of the Int~rnal Revenue Code. Just which is bett~r 
depends greatly on the company, but discussion of t his will be carried on 
later. 
Within the formal category ar~ of course, a wide variety of plans. 
But here we again find two more basic types. They are insured and uninsured 
plans. They are administered as the titles imply, by insurance companies 
on th~ one hand, and individual firms and banks on the oth~r. 
Let us look first into the uninsured or so-called self-administered 
plans. In this case, a trust is created, annual contributions ar e made to 
it, and the funds ar~ invested under the direction of the trustees or a 
pension committee. The plan is actuarially determined and assumptions of 
*18' p • . 1!J6. ·----~--------·--· --------------·----------------------
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interest,mort~lit,r and turnover ar~ made on a conservatively realistic 
basis. The fund is entirely separate from the control of the company for 
the benefit of whose employees it is intended. The benefits may be paid 
out of the fund as they fall due or a single premium annuity may be pur-
chased.* 
Many firms are not equipped or do not desire to have anything 
to do with the trust"3e work of the plan. This job is tbus often delegated 
to the trust department of a bank. There ar~ some banks, the most notable 
of which is Bankers Trust Co. of New York, which are especially equipped 
to handle such accounts and actively attempt to have them installed. They 
would perform all the duties from trustee of the funds to general adminis-
trator of the plan. Also under formal privately administered plans are 
profit-sh.'lring type plans. In the cases where such plans are used, no 
actuarial factors are involved, and contributions are entirely dependent 
on net profits, as are also the benefits. 
20 
The insurance companies in response to the competition from unin-
~Jred plans and between themselves, have developed a wide variety of pro-
grams. Generally they are of three basic types: individual contract plans, 
group annuity plans, and deposit administration plans. 
First of all, I will consider the individual contract plans. Most 
pension plans for small companies of ordinary financial strength are oper-
ated by the purchase of a standard retirement annuity or retirement income 
policy for each employee. Small companies, from an insuranc~ company point 
~---------------------------------·-----------------------------------------*5, p. 25. 
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of view, are those vith less than on~ hundred employees. If the firm has 
ov':lr fifty employees, however, some insur.s.nce companies provide what is 
knovm B. S a group permanent plan where one master contract will cover all 
the employees at one uniform rate. It still provides for individual poll-
cies for each employee.* 
The second major classification for insured plans is the group 
annul~ type plan. In tl1is case the contract would provide for the pur-
chase of guarant'3ed paid-up d'!f~rred annuity. Annuiths are pucha:eed each 
year as a credit for the current year of service.** 
Finally, there are the deposit administration plans. They are 
the insurance compsnies answer to the privately administerl3d plans. These 
plans provide for accumulation of a fund a t a guaranteed r ate of interest 
from which sums are taken at the employee's retirement date to buy an immedi-
ate annuity to cover the employee's pension. The funds and plan are ad-
ministered and trusteed by the insurance company but otherwise it is quite 
similar to an uninsured plan.*** A further refinement of this is where 
the insur3nce company does not purchase L~ediate annuities but r ather 
benefits are paid out directly from the fund. The fund itself is credit9d 
with an amount equal to the net return on the whole portfolio of the insurance 
company. 
While we are on the subject of funded pl ans it may be well to 
look into the various methods used to fund these various plans. First, 
there i s the lgvel premium accumulation method, which is used primarily 
with individual annuity pension plans. It involves a det~rmination of 
*5, p . 26. 
**5, p. 27. 
***5, p. 28. 
--------~--------------~ , __________________________________ _ 
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the cash r~quired at a selected retirement age, to give a certain 
income, and pro-rating this amount in even payments over the life of the 
ulan.* 
A level percent of payroll is used in the ease of privately ad-
ministered plans, though this is not Universal since a step-rate may be 
u~ ~d just as well. To determine the percent of payroll used, the desired 
benefits are decided, and allowances for mortality, interest, withdrawals 
and salary increases are anticipated.** Variation in benefits or contribu-
tions would necessarily occur should th-e allowance f ail to work out as cal-
culated. 
A single premium deferred life annuity (calculated on a step-rate 
basis) is customarilly used with insured group annul ty p·lans. A series of 
paid-up annuities are purchased each year for each eligible employee to 
cover retirem~t benefits. Mortality turnover and expected interes t earnings 
are considered in dete~ining the contributions.*** 
As in the case of the self-administered plans astep-rate or 
level premium basis may be used in the case of deposit administration plans. 
The calculations and allowances are similar to the former case. 
Under the semi-formal .md formal categories there are no insured 
plans. They are either a trusteed type plan or handled by the company di-
rectly. These p+a.ns are not very large in number, as unfunded plans ac-
eount9d for about four percent of plans in eff9ct early in 1953.**** 
*5, p. 1. 
**5, p. 1. 
Semi-formal or partly funded plans as they may be eall<:!d, fall 
===§, p. 1. 
7. p. 19. 
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into' t wo b~sic types. First there are t hose plans which are partly 
funded during employm:ent. Only future service credits woul d be paid, 
with no consideration of past service credits, except perhaps for interest 
on such credits. Such plans .would be operated as a trustee type, and are 
considered -qualified under section 165a.* As in trusteed plans, the cost 
i s actuarially determined with premiums pai d on a level or step r a te basis. 
The other ba~3 lc variety of a semi-formal plan is one which is 
pe.rtly funded at retir':!ment. In this case, a single amount calcul ated to 
lme sufficient to pay the l ife income of the insured, is paid into the 
fund at the time he retires. A variation of t his would be to have t his 
single amount spread over a number of years, five or so, plu s int<:lrest. 
A plan such a s this woul d not qualify under section l65a.** 
Under the informal plans, there are again t wo basic varieties. 
In the one case there may be some sort of formula for benefits while in 
the other they would be discretionary. In the latter case, benefits are 
based on needs or genero~sity of mana gement and of course, are open to much 
favoritism. The amounts of these plans are met out of current income, a 
pay as you go system. Although a bookkeeping reserve may be established, 
the reserves are nev':!r separ ated from the general assets of the company.*** 
--~----------·-------------------~------------------------------------------*5, P• 56. 
**5, p . 56 
***5, p . 56. 
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Cb8.rt II 
Pattern of Pension Plans Today 
CHAPTFR IV 
AN ANALYSIS OF OUR PRESENT PENSION STRUCTURE 
In the previous chapter, the various basic types of pensions 
wer8 presented with a bri~f description of each, but now, at this point, 
I would like to compare the formal witt the informal, the insured with the 
uninsured plans. 
First of all let us look at the case of formal versus informal 
plans. The unfunded method is really more an absence of a system than 
it is a system.* The reserves, if there are any, are eo-mingled with the 
general assets of the company and consequently the costs of the plan are 
being met out of current income. There is, however, one feature which 
might appeal to managem~t and that is the ind~pendenc~ they have in the 
administration of the plan. It would be the simplest to follow since there 
are no outsiders who would insist on a detailed set of rules or a say in 
the administration. I am thinking especially of the unions, who have pro-
gressively crowded in on more and more duties that were exclusively manage-
ment prerogatives. 
It is claimed that informal pay-as-you-go plans are more ~x-
p~sive, but this is not necessarily so. Since all funds remain with the 
company, and if the company has a consistently high return on its invest-
ment, it might b9 just the rev~rse. P13nsions, however, present a few proB-
lems of an actuarial nature which might well hurt even the strongest company. 
No company can expect a rise in business in the face of a recession, with 
the possible exception of a new growth industry.~· If a decline in busin~ss 
----------------------------------------------------------------------*4, "? • 18. 
#E19ctrical a~pliances, sup~rmark9ts ar9 ~xceptions of the 50's. 
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is then accompanied by an incrgase in th~ cost of pensions, eithgr the 
company or th~ pension will hav~ to go und'3r, and the odds are heavily 
in favor of t h8latter COllrse. Th'3 truth of this situation might not be 
apparent to those installing such a system, for in the first years a small 
percent of payroll can give very handsome benefits for thos~ who would 
~nter retirement. As time passes on there is not only this ever increasing 
group, but perhaps a sudden block that became eligible. 
Employees know the weakness of such plans and the sense of securi-
ty that pension plans are supposed to convey to the employee certainly 
csnnot be present to the degree possible under a complgtely funded plan. 
The fUnded plan, takes into consideration all actuarial f actors that may 
affect it, and anticipates good times and bad times. Skipping an occasional 
year costs most plans only two to three percent, and does not affect tham 
at all once they ar~ made up.* After a worker's productive years are over, 
a properly established fund will be big enough to pay the entir e pension 
liability. 
Informal plans also have two more important disadvantages when 
compared to formal ones. In the first place, informal plans by their very 
nature cannot be contributory. The whole cost to the company is over and 
above their regular labor cost. In some formal plans, the ~mploye'3 himself 
will contribute, out of his current income, reducing thereby the cost to 
the company. Secondly, there is the matter of a tax advantage . The Feder-
al Gov~rnm~nt in an attempt to ~courag~ formal pensions, allows contribu-
tions to pension fUnds to be consid~red d~uotible from taxable income. L~t 
us take a brief look into th~ tax aspects of pension plans. 
---------------------------------------------·------------------·----------*5, p. 25. 
Contributions made by firms to pension funds are subject to 
three types of limits on deductibility. First, there is th~ fiv~ percent 
limit as measured by the employee payroll. All contributions not in ex-
c~ss of five p~rcent of the payroll, paid or accru~d, to all employees 
participating in the plan, are deductible.* 
The second type of limit on deductions from gross for tax pur-
poses is the /level method limit. The ruling in this case is th~ amount 
of contributions which are actuarially necessary in terms of a level amount 
or a level percent of compensation, over the remaining future service of 
each employee participating to provide credits for both past and current 
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s~TVice. If past credits are to be funded in less than ten years, approval 
of the Treasury Department is necessary.** 
Finally, th8re is the normal cost plus limit. This method permits 
deductions of so-called normal cost plus an amount ~qual to one-tenth of 
the cost of funding past service, or other supplementary pension annuity 
credits. Normal ·cost is the cost actuarially det~rmined which would be 
necessary to maintain the plan if all past credits had been fUnded.*** 
Administrative expens"3s connected with the op<:lrations of the 
plan are considered ordinary business ~xpenses, ~rovided they are not paid 
out of the company's contribution to the plan.**** 
Should the payments to a pl an exceed the maximum limits allowed, 
the excess may be carried over into future years in which the ~ayments do not 
exhaust the maximum allowance. This deduction, however, must be in thq next 
taxable y~ar and only to the extent of any difference between the maximum 
·--~=-------~-~~---------·----------------~~ *5, p. 40. 
**5, p. 40. 
***5, p. 40. 
****5, p. 41. 
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amount deductible in the previews year and the amount actually paid for 
that y~e.r. * 
The pension when paid, is of course t axable as personal income to 
the former employee, except in so far as he contributed to the plan. The 
limit the employer may deduct from his gross income i s anything over three 
percent of the aggregate of his contributions, until he has recover~d them 
t ax f ree. If t he whole pension is paid to him in one year, it is t axed as 
a long t 9rm capi tal gain, and when the benefits are paid exclu pively as 
compensation for personal injuries or sickness they are completely tax 
exempt.** 
Becau se of the v~rious factors pointed out, it is not difficult 
to see the advantage of using a funded plan. These may well be instances 
of successful private plans which are on a pay-as-you-go basis, but as a 
mat~er of generalization, their disadvant ages outweigh their advantages. 
But what of the case of the insured plans V<::!rsus th'3 uninsured? 
Is one better than the other? The answer in t his case is, it all depends. 
Handling a pension account i s a matter that requ i res much skill and 
knowledge, and a good deal of time, to mention a few of th'3 prerequisites. 
Some private firms have the requirements, others do not and depend on out-
siders. Pensions also involve actuarial factors which limit the ability of 
some priva t<J f'irms to go it alone. Argum<:!nts can be f ound :for both sides 
and there is no cut and dried answer to the problem. There are, however, 
some factors that are generally used wh!3n considering this problem rhich 
------------~~--------------------------------------~--------------------*5, -p. 41. 
**5, p . 42. 
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1are worth while consid~ring. 
The first argum'3nts that come to mind in regard to privately 
administered plans, other than t ho se involving return on inv~s~~ent are 
such as: retention of control over the fUnds, cutting out the cost of 
an insurance carri'3r - more for each dollar contributed, the parties in-
volv~d can determine their own policies and they are most adaptable to 
the local situation.* Also often 90inted out is the fact that the company 
retains ful l br:mefit from turnover , part of which would go to an insurance 
carrier. Also more credit and good will would accrue to the company that 
operates its own plan.** Another fl3ature of great import'3.nce to the company 
operating its own pl an, is that it may have greater freedom to suspend con-
tributions in bad y~;~ars and make them up later, and also thus take the tax 
benefits when they will do the most good .~~ 
When it comes t o the point of yields, there is no argument that 
uninsured plans can and have shown gr ea.t"lr r eturns. This, of course, comes 
from the fact tha t their investmtiDts are not regulated by a list of legals; 
but only by the degree of conservatism found in the first argument. This 
is not to say that privately administered plans mean i pso facto higher yields. 
It i s quite possible that practical operating conditions may impose re-
striations just as severe as legal ones, especially in the smaller plans. 
A diversified portfolio can become a non-paying proposition when i n and out 
expenses, such as taxes and commissions represent the equivalent of a year's 
--~----~------ , ___________________________________________________________ _ 
*4, p. 21. 
**5, p. 25. 
***5, p. 25. 
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incom~, making adjustments to changing securiti~s very difficult. No 
matt~r how lib~ral th~ tru st agr~8ment, a certain amount of safety of 
principle mu st be con sidered, and so some small~r firms achi~ve t his di-
Vf3!"Sificati on and thus safety throu gh such means as buying Unit9d Stat~s 
Gov7.rnment Series A bonds and through purchase of inves t ment company 
shares.* 
It is, however, possible for the larger uninsur~d plans to show 
a real diff erence in yield in the long run, and is an important factor in 
the decision to adopt this form r ather than an insured plan. The importance 
of the investment factor is too easily overlooked in th~ rush of setting up 
a r<:ltirement program. "It sometim~s pays to do business the hard way."** 
One tenth of a point better investment yield can mean enough cost reduction 
to affect a t wo and one-half rise in current expens~s, so that if by raising 
expenses just ten or fiftean percent, an investment yield can be raised from 
t wo and one-hs.lf to three percent, there is real savings.*** Pucheck in 
his studies of pension plans in upper New York State pointed out t wo con-
trasting situations.**** On the one hand, individual annuity plans in some 
cases have not proven so satisfactory over a p~riod of time because th~ 
employ~~ contributions are often a fixed percent of compensation, which the 
rising costs required a proportionately l arger premium. In the case of sel f-
administered pl.:ms, however, he found that the good r<:lturns on the invest-
ment of the pension fund made it quite successful. In t his case the funds 
were: fifty-six percent in Government bonds, t vrenty-eight percent in other 
--~~----,·----·--------~-------~-----------
*5, p. 28. 
**5, p. 28. 
***5, p. 28. 
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bonds and mortgages , and fifteen percent in common and pr~f~rred stock. 
Ev':ln in the larger uninsured plans th<!re is a chance that a sudden 
increased drai n on the fUnd, might, as was pointed out before, catch it 
short case wise and force liquidations in an unfavorable market. Never-
theless, many firms have adopted their own plans and have done so primarily 
f or the purpose of gaining that extra one-half to one percent per year 
better return on their investment. It must be granted, how~ver, that the 
firm must be large enough for actuarial assumptions to approximate experi-
ence, and t hat ~ds are large enough to allow diversification, and that 
the firm ei ther have someone with inves~ment experience in their ranks* 
or use the choice of a bank or counciling service that does . 
The emphasis so far has been on the uninsured plan, but there 
are also some positive things to be said about insur.ed plans. Pensions 
are just part of an insurance company's business, and the receipts of 
these pension funds are merged with the general assets of the company. 
Return on investment in this case must be considered in terms of the re-
turn on the whole portfolio of the insurance company. Unless a partieular 
plan has had to counter balance an unfavorable loss, it will participate 
in some manner in the insurance company's earnings. 
As investment vehicles, insurance companies have demonstrated 
a steady- degree of favorable r'3turn. Insurance firms orten can errect 
considerable economi~s in the administration o~ investments.** This has 
been noticeable especially in the last decade when large scale loans, 
made direct rather than handled as public bond issues have become popular. 
---------------------------------------·----~--------------------------*5, p. 4. 
**5, :!.'•29. 
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Dir~ct placement means the costs of und9rwriting and marketing are saved. 
This does not n8cessarily guarante~ a higher return though it is, however, 
a possibility. In addition to this, may of the insurance companies h~t'Te 
an above av'3rage yield from real estate mortgages. 
Aside from direct considera tionsof yield A. T.0· s theimer in his 
pamphlet, The Case for I_;n~u~ed Pm_sion Plan.§._ points out four major points 
of argum<:lnt to affect the higher yields that uninsured plans might be able 
to show.* 
First of all, on the date the insurance company receives each 
premium under an insur'3d plan, interes t starts to acc·:rue at the guaranteed 
interest rate, which is equivalent to full automatic investm<:Jnt within the 
insurance company's portfolio. In an uninsured plan, investm'3nt might be 
delayed, with a resultant loss of interest. Secondly, insured plan funds 
are commingled with al l the other funds of the insurance company without 
the segregation of investments in the name of any one plan . In uninsured 
pl ans, the portfolio is credited from scra tch and has to stand on its own 
feet. In an insured plan the guaranteed interest rate is net after all 
investment expenses and aft'3r allowing for amortization of premiums and 
discounts. In an uninsured plan, on the other hand, the payment of in-
vestment expenses affects the gross yield of the portfolio, and so may 
the method of evaluating the security holdings. Finally, in an insured 
plan the insurance company guarantees both the safety of principal and 
the rate of inter~st provided by the contract because of its agre~ment to 
pay at specific future dates, the precise benefits which hav~ been pur-
chased by th~ employer's contribution, and the interest th'3r<:lon. In an 
- - --*2, p. 9. ------------~-------~----------· ------------
uninsured plan there are no such guarante~s. 
Is one m~thod, insured or uninsured, better than the other? I 
think the arguments mentioned here point out that there is no one answer. 
Both ideas have their advantages and disadvantages in relation to each 
other. Ther~ is something that neither of them takes into account, how-
aver, and that is the insuring of the adequacy of pension payments to 
the recipient upon his retirement. Privately administered plens have been 
able to show higher returns on their investment than the insured, and 
though it has enabled somewhat lower contributions, it has not met the 
problem of inadequacy of real benefits to employe~s. Some plans have 
fixed benefits as a percent of final income, the last five years or so, 
but this will not compensate for what happens thereafter. Once a person 
is receiving a pension, the amount is fixed for the rest of his life. 
Besides this drawback for the individual, it is also not the soundest 
way to operate a pension from the company point of view.* 
This is carrying the discussion into the next part of this 
thesis, where I plan to take up this problem in mor e detail and point 
out a possible method of alleviating this condition. In conclusion here, 
I wish to state that what we have accomplished so far is noteworthy. There 
is no reason to stop, how'3ver, and even within the past t wo years a new 
idea has been brought forth. But this I will also discuss at a latter 
point. It is no easy task to keep pension demands on business reasonabl9, 
yet have the benefits just and adequate. The plans in the past have 
w~ighed the former consideration more heavily than the later, and wisely 
so. Plans that ar~ burdensome on business, are a damp~r to progress. But 
*15, p. 52. 
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if a way can b~ had whereby benefits can be adequate yet not burdensome 
on business, it should be investigated and given a chance to prove its 
worth. 
CHAPTER V 
IS THERE SECURITY IN PENSIONS TODAY? 
In the prr:!vious chapt<:!rS I hs.ve now and again mad~;) r<:!f":!rences 
to th~ one weakness that i s universal in pensions today. I h~ve inferred 
th~t for the individual, th~ present patterns of pension nlans do not 
give him the real security he has planned on. Guaranteed dollar ben~fits 
are a progressive step forward from discr·?. tionary plans of an unfunded 
n s.ture, but they are not the answer t o the reality of today' s economic 
situation . Nothing could be finer than to have a guarant~ed fixed income 
upon retir~ment, if the real value of those benefits ~lso r r:!mained fixed. 
Such is not the case in our economy. Ours is one of ever fluctuating 
values, and a retirem~t program to be adequate and dependable must have 
some flexibility built into it. 
Suppose for example that a couple r stired in 1940 on e. private 
nen sion of $95. per month, plus social security benefits,* which wer~ 
anywher~ from $15.00 to $67.50 per month per couple. Let us also a ssume 
that they were entitled to the mean amount of social security benefits, 
or $41. 25 per month. The t wo sources would give them a monthly income 
of $136.25, or about $59.50 per week. In 1940 the couple could g~t by, 
but what has happened si nce then? By 1950 the cos t of living index had 
gone from 100 to 175, and prices have continued to climb from that point, 
until just recently w~ have noticed some weaknesses. To keep up with that 
pace our couple would hE~e had to receive $258.44 per month. But even 
t he most recent changes in the Social Security Lav; would ha\Ye brought 
----~~-----~------------------------------------------
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their pension payments up to only $177.50, assuming again the m~an 
social security benefits possible. This woul d give them on a we<?.kly 
basis $41.00 or a 32% increase over 1940, an increase that does not re-
flect the extent of the ch~ges in our economy. Now if the price 
structure should collapse, the old retired couple might once again be 
well off, but at the expense of a major portion of the economy. Tha t 
is not to say tha t a drop in the price level is harmful, quite the con-
trary, if industrial production continues to expand. HoweveT, falling 
prices generally follow a business slump, and for those to come dovm to 
pr<:Jvious lev<:Jls might mean that a rather severe recession is upon us. 
Rath<;lr than hope for relief that way, I think it would be better to re-
construct our methods of providing for retirement incomes. 
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Right now our economy is sitting in a delicate state of balance, 
though the weight of downward pressures appears to be steadily increasing. 
There are some authorities that believe, however, that our economy has a 
built in inflationary bias, especially in periods of war or int'3rnational 
tension, accompanied by heavy expenditures for defense.* Our tax structure, 
escalator wage clauses, parity prices, budget deficits, governmental bor-
rowing from commercial banks, low rates of interest, cost plus contracts, 
as w,:;ll as emphasis on full employm<mt, the public W9lfare state and a 
reluctance to anything res<;lmbling a free gold standard, are the prime 
reasons for such belief in an inflationary bias. If these forces should 
reign predominant in the future, and if we assume a steady price rise of 
-----------------..... ---·----· ·-----------------
*9, p. 8. 
. two percent for the next thirty-five years, it would mean that we would 
be faced with a price lev'!!l twice as high as we now have.* 
Just which way the economy moves should hot have to be the re-
gard of any retired person. At any one time the forces of inflation or 
deflation ~dll tend to predominate, but as these f actors are not stable, 
they should not be the basis of our thoughts and considerations about 
pension programs . Our objective should always be "to provide reasonable:! 
security for the retired person regardless of the direction in which the 
economy moves."** There is no such thing as a perfect investment hedge 
against inf l ation, but certainly creditor securities alone do not come 
close to the goal of flexibility so. necessary in our economy. Retirement 
.security .cnn be substantially enhanced only by an expanding and broadened 
concept of proper diversification. 
As I mentioned previously, the best we have done so far to take 
inflationary factors into consideration has been the development of a 
benefit fo rmula based on final earnings. What is being offer~d in this 
case is a "pension which is promised to an employee for work done during 
his twenties, thirties, and forties, and which depends upon his earnings 
between age fifty-five or sixty and age sixty-five."*** Thus, not only . 
is there an apparent weakness in that the only inflation considered is 
that which occurs during the working life of the recipient, without con-
sideration of what might happen thereaft'3r , but ther '3 is a real dang'3r to 
the employee. This sort of commitment involves a. guess as to what the 
*17, p. 52. 
**9, p. 8. 
***15' p. 62. 
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wage l~vels will be when the employee reaches retirement age, and what 
the company's ability will be at that date, to meet the pension promise. 
Perhaps normal wage inc-reases can be properly accounted for and funded 
over the whole working period of the recipient, but actuarial as sumptions 
cannot t~e care of abnormal or unexpected increases in wage l evels. 
C. R. Henderson in his articl'3, A_Better Pension Pl.§.D..-.* also 
pointed out a most interesting and important fact. Our present att empts 
to adjust pensions to rises i n the price level through final earnings 
formula s is undesirable because of the stress it places on need r ather 
than production. The proponents of final earnings formulas argue tha t 
pensions should haYe some relation to an employees income just prior to 
retirement, because not . only is this a way of protecting against infia.tion, 
but also it in some measure supports the employee in"the style to which 
he is accustomed~** The danger in such thinking Mr. Henderson feels, is 
in the fact that we can never satisfY all the needs we have and so only 
disillusionment and discontent can be the result of such thinking. To 
a ggravate the discontent so areated, is the fact that our present pgnsions 
are tied to fixed income securities ~d benefits once begun are necessarily 
also fixed. Consequently, the se same needs that we tried to fill when 
the worker entered upon his retiremBnt can no longer be filled in the 
f ace of an inflationary rise in the price lgvel. 
The way out of th<:J dil~mma points in only one di-r13ction, the 
gr~ater and prop~r use of higher yielding seauriti~s tha~ are going to 
take care of rises in the price level and standard of living. One look 
------------------------~----~---~-------*15, p. 64 . 
**Hi, p . 64. 
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at the chart of th~ cost of living for the period of industrialization 
in the United States shows why it is wrong: and unrealistic to expect 
savings in the price l~vel to offer compension in one period for harm 
done in another, to people living on a fixed income annuity. The price 




Cost of Living Index 
CHAPTER VI 
GREATER PENSION SECURITY FROM COMMON STOCK 
Can equity securities really help the r•:rt.ired ~erson maintain 
the purchasing pow~r of his pension? Is there a "general factor" between 
common stock pric~s, yields, and the price level? From all indications, 
the answer is an ~mphatic yes. To determine the answer, it is necessary 
to look back through past records. As I have stated before, our economy 
is a dynamic one and positive correlations of the past do not necessarily 
have to continued in the future. This fact does not outlaw attempts to 
improve the natu•·e of pension ben'3fits, however, it means rather that 
we should always be on the alert to compensate for any fundamental changes 
that may occur in our economy. The person living off a fixed annuity from 
the period of 1880 to a~out 1900 had nothing to worry about as far as in-
flations were concerned. But since then, and especially since 1915, there 
have be<m violent swings in the cost of living. It has taken us until nnw 
to begin to do something <Jbout the hardships inflation is creating. This 
matter should have been investigated and considered before this, but change 
is often hard to bring about. Should this new concept of protecting pensions 
through the use of equities become generally accepted, and subsequently out-
moded, I would be the first to support any change for the better, that can 
show similar supporting evidence as is available for the argum~t for this 
greater use of equities. 
Before this new concept can become a universal reality, it is n~c~s­
sary tha.t there be a change of attitude among thos"3 persons r~!Sponsible for 
the administration and investment of pension funds and among those who are 
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to benefit later from them. There has been a tendency in rec~t years 
for pension funds administered other than by insurance co~parties, to 
place more of the fUnds in common stocks, but this alone will not neces-
S:J.rily lead to better pension progr3.1D.s. 
In a review made by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, it 
was stated that a typical ratio for uninsured pension fund investment 
appears to be about twenty-five percent common stock with maybe five per-
cent or more in preferred. A more recent figure indicates that some 
funds have as much :·:s 55-40% in common stock.* Governm~mt securities 
make up fifteen percent or less with the better grade corporate bonds 
making up the remaining fifty-five percent.** Other favorable factors 
are that many of t he debt securities acquired have been purchased via 
direct placement, giving the purchaser a better yield. 
Despite this greater reliance on equities the emphasis h~.s 
still been on fixed benl3fit a.nnuities. Not only does this not give the 
rBcipient of the pension better protection against inflation, but it also 
puts the companies in an undesirable position. In the same article 
r:;)ferred to above, it was stated that the nature of the 11 pcmsion trust 
portfolios concisting principally of long term debt and equity invest-
ments, reflects their investment requirements: the absence of need for 
liquid investments (since liquidity is assured by the constant inflow 
of new money), the emphasis on quality, and th":l tendency to regard nuctua.-
tions in market prices of inves tments as a secondary consid":lration."*** 
--------------~------~----~------------------*16, p. 286. 
**8, p. 188. 
***8, p. 188. 
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With these last two requirements I will not argue, .. but in r:;;gard 
to the first one, I h 9.ve some doubts as to its unquali:fied validity. It 
is a matter of historical record, th9.t corporate earnings with f~w 9XC9ptions 
h'lv~ not fared nearly so well in periods of depression as they hav~ during 
prosperity. Thus, in th9 first place, each dollar placed into a Pension 
fund has been come by harder, and is more reluctantly parted with. If it 
is necessary, the corporation might well suspend full payment for a period 
of t.ime. Also along with depressions there are customarily r .s.ther l arge 
scale layoffs of employees. In a recent study by the Bankers Tru s t Company 
of New York , two hundred thirty-five co~anies were studied a s to new plans 
put into effect or old ones revised,* and upon close examination of the list 
it would not be an exaggeration to state that em?loyment in at leas t fifty-
five percent of th~m is subject to wide fluctuations. This means that there 
will be f~wer in these pension plans .md consequ'3ntly less new capital will 
be f lowing into the pension funds. On the other hand, ther e will be no less 
but perhaps even mor e persons drawing on these pension funds. 
Now the only other source of liquidity is from income and realiz'3d 
ca1)ital gains on the investment. In p =:! riods of poor business conditions it 
is not reasonable to suppose thG.t equity securities are going to be .. aying 
bett~r dividends than before. Even some of the debt securiti'3S might go 
into d'3fault. Th'3re is always recourse to the capital of the fund itself, 
but this woul d j'3opa.rdize futur'3 payments, l'l.nd ·it was stated in the first 
place, that recourse to such a step woul d not be necessary. I cont~nd, ho <-
ever, that this very well might be necessary. No reces sion as we faced in 
~--·--------~--------------- --------
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1949 wou1 _d be enough to cau s e thes e di r 8 p r edictions to come true, 
but soma.thi ng of the n a turP. of 1952 very w'-311 might. We all hop e such 
a situation will never ari s e, but the mere f act that it is a pos si bility 
shoul d be reckoned with. 
What is all this discussion leading to? Sim~ly t his, if the 
com·· any inBti tuting a pension program wishes to offer f ixed benefits to 
its empllyees, l et them inves t the funds prim~trily in fixed obli ga tions. 
Do not mix higher yielding, but more fluctua ting securities into a plan 
where fixed obligations mu st be met. The principle is true L"'l the case 
of pensions as it is in thr:J case of corporation finance. Why i s it possi-
ble for a public utility to carry a l a rge debt (fixed obligation) capi t ali-
z~tion while t h e same thing for a locomotive manufacturer would be finan-
cia l suicide? It is only possible to commit yourself to fixed obligations , 
if you can depend on your source of income. Are th~ revenues of an in-
du s t rial enterprise, and consequently its ability to mel3t an unyielding 
demand from a pension fund, so stable as to allow this same fund, upon 
which its empl oyees dep end ~or their future security, also to be invested 
in something tha t in turn is an unstable source of revenue? Not if the 
employees art told to count on a fixed dollar b enefit. Such t 9..ctics. can 
w~ll le·'id to bitter disappointment for thos e unfortunate employees, who 
d8p ended upon t he wisdom of tho s e who had the duty of the fund in their 
hands, and Eb the well being of thP- worker. The obligs.tions of a pension 
are alr~ady sufficigot for th~ company to carry, and to imoose an even 
grea ter ch8r.ge during depressed times to meet paym~nts that were fornerly 
met in a full employment economy would be impossible. At the very time 
44 
the ~mployer-~.would. wish the fund to carry itself for a while it is 
suffering losses in income and decreases in capital value. 
Why paint such a black picture for thB use of equities in 
pension funds? The Bxp.:;rience so f ar has been quite satisfactory, and 
I previously st::1. ted that they could be used quite safely. What I wish 
to avoid is th~ir misuse, and anything I can say to avoid this, I feel, 
is propBr to mention. I said what we needed in order to use this new 
concept successfully was a new attitude. Why tie the investments of a 
fund to a media that will fluctuate with general economic activity, and 
not have the benefits also fluctuate accordingly. e~ch a policy is not 
consistent. Until now all the benefits that have accrued from the 
greater use of equities have be~ passed on to the corporation in the 
form of lower premium payments. The reverse mu st also happen should there 
be a reversal in the returns on these funds. Why not fix the contributions 
to the fund and ha.ve the benefits fluctuate? It is a much more reasonable 
policy and a much sounder one. It will enable the employer to know just 
whl!l.t is expected of him in the way of contributions, with no danger of 
him being faced with a larger demand, just when business is in a slump. 
The employee, on the other hand, is granted a measure of protection against 
the hazards of inflation. His pension i ncome will fluctuate with chang8S 
in the nriee levd and he will thus be a s sured of 'i more stable real dollar 
income. To sum up: the first change of attitude we need is on the part 
of those executing the pension funds. If ~ firm wou l d grant such benefits, 
let it be genuine. When advantages accrue to the fubd so created, let them 
remain with that fUnd for the advantage of those it is to benefit. It is 
more than just a.n act, it is sound business. 
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The second group wrlO mu s t b e reeducated so to speak, are the 
r ecipients of thes~ pension benefits. It seems as if ther e shoul d be no 
probl~m here , but in fact there is. Past prec~dent i s a 9owerful influ-
ence on man's mind. It is the basis of discussion evgn for our courts 
of law, and so it follows, the relatively uneduc '3. ted individual will cling 
mor~ fervently than others to past traditions since he cannot as well under-
stand the advsntage of som~thing new. There has been on~ obvious f actor 
in our economy, however , for the ast d~cade that has not passed unnoticed 
by anyone, and which point9d out dramatically and graphically enough the in-
adequacy of a fixed dollar income. This infla tionary factor can make it 
easier for anyone to unde~stand the value of a real dollar income, and the 
problem of explanation is no longer whatit would have been a decade and a 
half ago. C. R. Henderson in the article which I referr~d to previously, 
gives a few guides to this explanation problem.* Deprecia tion as well as 
appr~ciation shoul d be overemphasized, so that the employee will understand 
fully that his retirement income may and will fluctuate, depreciation, how-
ev9r can be considered as the exception, rather than the rule. Most im-
portant perhaps is that the emphasis employees sho1.1ld pl ace on judging the 
success of the plan sho·uld be on the maintainence of earning power. 
So far in this chapter I h~ve stated two points. Firs t, it is 
possible to make greater use o~ equity securities in p~nsion funds so as 
to enable the retired person to maintain more n~arly his income, measured 
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in t~rms of purchasing power. Secondly, I point~d out that it might prove 
to be unwise to combine the newer concept of greater equity investment, with 
--~-------------------------------------------------------------------------*Hi, p. 74. 
the t raditbnal concept of fixed dollar benefits. In order for the fonn~r 
to be a successful innova tion over the long run, th9 latt~r must be altered. 
Th~r~ are real benefits to be gained by the greater use of e~uities,but not 
in the manner in which r~tirement programs are presently being handled. 
To clarify the validity o.f these st"''.tements I offer Chart IV. 
CHART IV 
CtH1MDN STOC!< PRICES, 
INVESTM~AIT YIELD ON l5'- 7S FlA NO, 
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This chart clearly demonstrates that th~ yield of a fund only 
t w7.nty-five p~rcent invested in common stock, a substantial yet cons~rva­
tive amount, will give th'3 recipi~t an income that is realistic in terms 
of the cost of living. The chart begins vdth a period of eo-called normal-
cy, runs through the depths of the great depression and the subsequent 
wartime and post war boom era. Surely such a time period emphasizes all 
the ~xtremes imaginable in our economy. Even a fifty-fifty fund would 
have given a yield suffici~t to main~ain an income that would not have 
dipped below the cost of living L'Yldex in the depths of the depression, and 
would, on the oth'i!r hand, not allowed it to dip below this index as the 
tw~ty-five - seventy-five fund did in 1945.* But as C. R. Henderson 
points out, perhaps it would be wise to be a bit more conservative with 
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a new idea, until at least it can d~monstrate its validity in actual practice. 
What woul d this mean to the retired person? Clearly and simply, here is a 
pension program that ean lick infiations. With a fixed benefit he would 
h'?.V9 fared quite well during the Thirties, but in the last decade he would 
have faced tremendous hardships. 
The implications of this concept to business is also of major 
importance, and will be discussed further at a later point. aere I just 
wish to state that pensions ba·sed on this concept will mor~ nearly be based 
on the earning power of our economy as a whole and will arrest to a degree 
this unhealthy tendency, so prevalent today, of business to saddle th~ms91V9S 
with debt. As I stat~d before , such a concept, one wher~ th9 retired 
·----------·~ -----------·----------
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person will rec~ive a pension varying in dollars but holding its own in 
purchasing power can, not only h~lp the individual, and is thus socially 
and economically sound on this basis, but also it helps business, and con-
sequently doubly sound. 
Pushing aside all considerations except the dollars and cqnts, 
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the yardstick by which the success or failure of a business is measured, 
what would be the possibility of business appropriating the benefits of a 
grea ter equity investment? I stated previously that I thought it would be 
unwise and again I point to Ch-~rt I for evidence. Unfortunately in the 
1950 1 s there was not the volume of pensions we have today. Since 1950 the 
number of persons covered has incr~ased over four fold, and the number of 
plans in eff ect is about three times what it was then.* I say unfortunately, 
because perhaps if our present volume had been reality then, and this 
tendency to include an ever increasing percent of equity securities in a 
portfolio that was to meet fixed obligations had also been carried on, then 
the danger of this practice would have in fact been demonstrated. Accord-
ing to Chart I the returns on. the fund described woul d have failed to yield 
an income suffici-mt to maintain fixed paym~mts in the years 1926-8, 1931-5 and 
again in 19D7. The difference would, of course, be made up from money flow-
ing into the fund and, if necessary, liquidation of part of the principal. 
In 1926-8 and in 1957 this would h'lve been possible. In the former period 
business was good and an increased chau.~t would have been .carried. Besides, 
the market value of the principal was very favorable. In 1957 profits were 
not as good and the value of the principal not as great, but the de.ficiency 
-----------------------------------------*S~ ~ Tabl.; . I. 
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might w~ll have been met without too much difficulty. But what of the 
period of 1931-55? Here the return on the fund was below the requi!."e-
ments, earnings of corporations wer e off considerably, and the value of 
th~ principal was down. From whence was the money to come? Out of a re-
serve built up in good times? It i s the only possibility, yet no such re-
serve would have been built up because the practice was to pass the bene-
fits of high~r yield on to the corporation in the form of lower contribu-
tions. Besides building up a surplus in such a fund runs afoul with the 
. 
t ax laws. The only thing to do in such a situation is reduce the benefit 
payments, a breach of faith and trust. 
To sum up the results of a retirement income program, where the 
fluctuations in yhld accrue to the recipients I quote from Hen-derson. 
"The desirability of security against infla tion ••• shoul d mean more than 
ev8r today in view of the fact that we face ••• continued df'3f icit financ-
ing by the government. Moreover, the employee is not risking disaster 
i n the event prices go dovm ••• he ought to be able t o f a ce the possibility 
of future recessions wi th confidence. Moreover, the program will pre-
serve its vitality during depressed periods and provide 8xpanded il1come 
when the business cycle turns up, because it is so set up th:tt the e is 
never any forced liquidation of common stocks to meet a fixed dollar com-
mi tm<:Jnt. "* 
--------~--------------·------------- ------~-=----
CHAPTER VII 
THE DETERRENTS TO THE GREATER USE OF EQUITIES 
The development of pension plans in the United States, as I 
have tried to point out, has been basically an evolutionary process. It 
is the n~tural and only way any social and economic change should come 
about in a democracy, and though we sometimes bemoan the fact that some 
events do not occur fast~r than they do, we realize that the most good 
for the most people is more assured this way. There was in t he Thirties 
a sort of revolution in social and economic thought, and thou gh we were 
mor<:l prone to forget the mor<:l conservative principle of evolution because 
of the dire distress of the economy at t he time, we still rebelled at some 
of the r ash moves of the leaders of that time. I said above that p~msion 
plan development was basically evolutionary, but because of th<:l tempo of 
the times, there has developed what I consider an unnatural situ 9..tion, one 
which is just beginning to show signs of strai ghtening itself out. We can 
see today a much differ<:lnt attitude toward the inves ·~men t of p<:lnsion funds. 
The attitude is healthy for the individual and the economy both, if used 
properly. Bere is wher~ the problem lies with us today. Pension funds that 
have a more liberal investment policy hav<:l demonstrated real savings to those 
gr~nting t he plans . This more liberal investm<:lnt policy has , however, worked 
in a period of prosperity, and many people forget that thet-e are such t hings 
as depressions. Along with t his more flexible investm~nt policy has not come 
a new flexible benefit policy. This inconsistency may work real hardship 
on some nl a.ns in the futur~ when our present prospgrity is no longer with us. 
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But I do not wish to bring up the arguments presented in the 
previous chapt9r again. I just wish to state that perhaps this unnatural 
combination ve find in some pensions today will demonstrate the need for 
;v:ariable income pension plans on purely bueiness grounds. Our prosperity 
has fostered the evolutionary venture into the greater use of eC!_ui ty securi-
ties i n pensions, but has not pointed out the need for a change in pension 
benefit concepts. The change, however, will come about, whether it be 
forced by business necessity or gradual acceptance of a new idea. 
I mentioned above that we are witnessing a new attitude in invest-
ment of pension funds. I men-tioned also that it was perhaps fostered a 
great deal by our prosperity and desire to capitalize on the favorable 
returns found in equity inves tment. This change in attitude is, moreover, 
a n ecessary prerequisite to the adoption of the new concept of pension plans 
of which I speak. Equity inves tment is hazardous and ther e are several im-
portant reasons why it was not tried sooner. Traditional attitudes, and 
the pattern of pension development are t wo important factors. The risks 
in equity financing are a third and most important factor. It is all too 
easy to over-simplify a concept and make it appear a s a most rea sonable and 
sound plan. Some of the determinants to the greater use of equities point 
out basic risk hazards involved in the development of the equity portion of 
the pension fund portfolio. At this point I ~ill point out various f actors 
that have held back the greater use of equities and how some re sent a 
problem in inves tment. 
Trf.l.ditional concepts of proper investment is one of ths major 
hurdles that has to be straddled before the accept ance of a variable income 
pension progr~m can be initiated. As I have stated, we hav~ in rec~nt 
years t~nded to look more favorably on equity securities in portfolios 
of pension funds, ~ortfolios that formerly we thought should be made up 
of only bonds and perhaps onl y a few ve17 high quality equities. ~ 
typical opinion was expres sed by T. A. Ostheimer wh<m he said: "Those 
in ch9.rge of the investment operations of pension trusts, seem to find 
it difficult to escape the conclusion that capital gains and high r ates 
of returns ar~ not nearly as important as the pres~rv~tion of principal 
coupled with a mod~rate yield."* If th~ trust i s to meet obligations 
th~t are fixed in dollar amounts, it is possible to maintain this attitude. 
If we are to move on to a newer concept of pensions, capital gains and 
high r ates of return ar'9 a definite and important considera tion. It is 
not only in the case of insurgd plans that we find conservative invest-
ment attitude. Take for exam:!Jle the pension fund of American Telephone 
and Telegr~ph Company. Here we find a fund of approximately $1,660,000,000 
inves ted by Bankers Trust Company acting as truste-e, in "certain t ypes of 
government obl igations and in corpor";l.te bonds, debentures and notes, all 
of which qualify as investments for l ife insurance companies und~r New York 
law."** Certainly a fund of that magnitude could saf'ely include some egui ty 
investment, even though the fund is tied to fixed benef'it annuities. Ultra 
conservatism as is demonstrated in this case is naturally a block to the 
development of ne~ concepts. 
Invl3stors of p13nsion funds should let themselves have ·more room 
---~- ----· ------·--------------------------------.. ----
*2, p . S. 
**10, p. 15. 
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for movem~nt . Only exp~rimentation will lead us to mor~ and bett~r ways 
of doing t hings. So long as we circumscribe our thoughts and actions as 
rigorously as is done in the instructions for investment of the American 
Tel~phone and TelegraPh case, no new ideas can come forth. There are many 
cases of t he opoosite extr~me also which I am not in favor of, but some 
manner of discretion in p~IDsion f'und inV9S~'1lent, I believe, is the first 
st9p toward the evolutionary process of accepting 9.Il entirely new concept 
of pension fund handling and inves tment. 
Though the major portion of the funds are handled through unin-
sured pl ans, there is still a substantial amount that accumulates under 
plans administered by insurance companies. In 1951 the last year for ac-
curate figures, insured plans covered thirty-four percent of persons in 
private pension programs. All the fUnds derived from contributions natur-
ally were inves ted as part of the aggregate of insurance company ass~ts. 
In recent y':lars st ate laws have somewhat liberalized the requirem•:mts 
for insurance company investments, but many of these companies do not 
take full advant.9.g'3 of even these small allowances. Investors of these 
companies are steeped in the tra.di tion of creditor inv9stment, and are not 
particularly ansious to move out into the field of equities. The. r obliga-
tions are fixed, and safety of principal coupled with a moderate yield will 
give th<:ml suf'.ficient returns to draw a good return to net. 
In my discussion of the concept ofVariable income pensions, I 
talked in terms of uninsured plans . This does not m49an tha.t insurance 
comp~mies cannot institute similar plans . In fact, the Teachers Insuranct9 
and Annuity Association, whieh formerly issued only fixed benefit annuities, 
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he.s created a plan that e:m be adopted by insurance companies if they 
so wi sh. It woul d involve setting up a separate fund for the equity 
portion of the benefits. Explanation of this system will be carried 
on further along, but I just wish to point out her e that it is possi-
ble for insurance companies to adopt this new i dea. Judging from their 
past attitude tow~rd common stock inves tment, I wonder if they will 
willingly ~i.dopt the new idea. To the extent that they do not, and to 
the ext~nt that they control the flow of funds into pensions, the 
greater use of common stock in pension funds will be retarded. 
In the fUture their competitive position may be such that they 
will be forced t o adopt the concept. Just when that will be, I will not 
venture to say. To date, the demand for variable income pensions has 
been anythi ng but overwhelming. It is a new idea, only broached since 
1952, and i t might be quit e a while before enough persons know of it and 
want it. I mentioned the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association as 
one of tho se who have put the idea to work. Onder the uninsured plans 
ther e are two companies offering this t ype of plan: Long Island Light-
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ing Com9any and Chemistrand Corporation. Just recently the Equity Benef its 
Plans Inc. has been organiz'9d to advise companies about setting up variable 
income plans. Thus there is a beginning being made, time will tell how 
quickly it will be adopted. It is my opinion that the insurance companies 
will be slower to adopt it because of their conservative or isntation and 
the more fundamental change it will mean i..TJ. their administra tion of pensions. 
Besides the traditional conservatism connected with pension fUnd 
. investm<:mt, and the:! reliance on insur3Ilce comp3Ily plans wl:e:re both the above 
factors and legal limitations hav~ contained a greater reliance on ~quity 
securities, there are cer~~in definite risks in equity .investmsnt that 
tend to make investors shy away. This shyness may not be so evident at 
present, but it was apparent in the past. Though I have stated that I 
favor a greater venture into the field of common stocks, I also feel that 
considering the present nature of pensions, we might find we have gone 
overboard in some cases. There seems to be no consistency in investment 
policies today. On the one hand, we have the larg':l blocks of funds still 
very conservatively invested and on the other hand, we have plans t wenty-
five percent and more in equity, and guaranteeing a fixed return. The 
one represents a resistance to innovation, while the latter is a disregard 
of sound policy. 
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That it is easier to get wiped out when investing i n common stock 
than in creditor securities is obvious. It is possible for the whole amount 
of the common stoek position of a pension fund to be r~duced to nothing in 
the face of a sharp drop in the market. There are certain safe guards taken 
to avoid such a catastrophe, but despite them, serious setbacks can occur. 
We might do well to remember the risks, and even in the case of variable 
income pension plans, where liquidation of principal cannot be a factor in 
jeopardizing the fund, risk factors c8.Il result in a poor showing. A return 
equal at least to the cost of living is embodied in the principle of this 
concept. 
~t are these risks that traditionally at least, have acted as 
a deterrent to the greater use of equity securiti~s in pensions and vvhich 
we try to overcome in various ways? They may be divided into fiv~ varieties: 
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ps.ychological, credit, int~rest rate, market and inflation risks.* The 
degree and the success with which they are compensated for will be direct-
ly reflected in investment results. 
First and foremost is the psychological risk.** It carries 
out a t'31ldency we all have, to do what eve;ryone else is doing. Wha.t-
ever fashion decrees, we accept as proper. There are always a few who 
will hold back, but the longer a movement continues, the fewer are those, 
t hA.t will be able to contain themselves . Constant social p·ressure is 
put to bear on those who do not conform to the group norms. Individual 
thought and freedom of action are supposedly among the values W9 consider 
basic in our democracy, but sometimes it is considered quite improper 
to express oneself in a manner contrary to popular belief. 
To be more specific, let us l ook at today's situa t i on . Where is 
the market in securities today? - 290 plus, and going up. Will it continue? 
Of course, it might even go to 500. Or perhaps we might ask, are we going 
to have a rece3sion and if we do, hm•1 will that effect the market? The 
answer? Simple enough; sure we might see a five orten·_J>erMnt drop in 
business, but it will not be more than that, and as far as the stock 
market is concerned, General Electric, International Business Machine, 
Du Pont and the other sound stocks are cheap at their present prices, o.r 
so it seems from public interest in them. What does th~ Federal Govern-
ment have to say on the subject? Everything will be all right. Secr'3tary 
Wilson, for instance, informs us that the unemploym~nt in the Detroit 
ar'3a \IV'ill work itself out during the spring. Maybe so, maybe depressions 
are a thing of the past, and if you do not think so, you had better not 
*li u. 4. 
** '. p. 5. 
·~~-·~~~~~-----------
say so for fear of being labled a subversive. 
This is generally th~ nature of the fears that have afflict~d 
us. It is a problem of mass psychology, strongly endorsed by th~ heads 
of state. Who can long resist such pressur~s? You look foolish and out 
of step if you do. But when dealing with investments, succumbing to such 
pres sur~ can become very costly. The profits that people Se":l toda.y in 
their portfolios are paper profits, which in order to be realiz":ld must be 
brought before the market. 11It is simple mathematics that the majority 
of investors cannot convert paper profits into realized gains and will 
lose money." "Who, when the majority wishes to convert paper profits 
into cash profits, is going to buy at high prices?"* p·ersons entrusted 
with the t ask of investing the principal of a pension fund are just as 
susceptible to this mass movement as anyone else, especially when equity 
securities are a. sizeable portion of the fund, and the weaker a person's 
o~n personal convictions, the truer this is. 
Secondly, there is the interest rate risk.** As changes in money 
r ates occur, so do changes in the price of fixed income securities. The 
prices of these securities r":lact conv~rsely to changes i n the interest rate. 
As th":l latter goes up, which was the case until the beginning of June, 1953, 
the prices of these securities came down. But how does this have a rela tion 
to equity securitil9s? Simply this: · there ar~ some common stocks th9.t are 
bought largely for yield#,and these will react in a manner similar to pre-
ferred stocks and bonds. Moreover, al l stock prices ta.k'9 somg cognizance 
*1, p . 5. 
**1, :?· 6. 
#Utili ties, food chains are t vm popular cat~gories. 
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of the general l~ad of h1terest r a tes, and a significant change in the 
money mark13"t will aff':lct t heir value.* 
Market risk is the risk of buying securities when their price 
is high and being put in a position wher<:l liquidation i s forced at rela-
tively low 9rices.** The result of such a forced sale could be ruinous 
to a portfolio, pension or other ~ise . The fact that t nis risk is a clear 
and present danger is unfortunately being treated -too lightly by many 
pension funds. 
The fourth risk factor is the inflation risk. This risk factor 
i s playing ~ major role today. For over a decade now we hav~ seen a steadily 
rising price level, and we have wanted to protect ourselves against it. e 
have naturally looked for investmo:mt hedges that would protect our as s~ts 
against depreciation in real dollar terms. This is a proper and natural re-
action, but unfortunately, we tend to lose sight of the fact that the re-
versal might again face us. Presently we ar13 "psychologically unpr~par~d"*** 
for t his, and history shows that investors will dump their securities should 
deflation occur. Even in hedging against t his inflation ther~ are risks. 
"Stocks are not commodi-ties and their prices reflect earnings not commodity 
prices." Many companies are hurt by inflation and invgstors sinking their 
man gy into them may be sorely disillusioned. Take the soft drink industry 
for example. Her e the price of the product i s relatively set by cu stom, 
ygt the prices of the coiiL'llodi ties entering into them, p-rincipally sugar, has 
seen a substantial increase. 
-----·---------
*1, p . 7. 
**1, p . 9. 
~E-**1, p . 10. 
--------·---------------------------------------
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FLnally there are the credit risks.* This is thB risk factor 
most investors ar~ w~ll aware of, but it is one that has not cau s~d the 
mo st losses. It mo st surely i s a f actor to be contended with, but it should 
not be considered abovs all els8 as is too often done. Vi e should become 
more aware of som? of the other risks and pay them more heed. 
--------------------------------------------------*1, p . 6. 
CHAPTER VIII 
COMBATING RISKS OF INVESTMENTS IN EQUITIES 
Thus far I have only point9d out the risks i nvolV9d in com..mon 
stock inv~stment. Now I would lik9 to point out and demonstrate how 
th~s ~ risks can be minimized. The proposals I will here off er ar9 often 
easi~r to discuss than to practice actually, but lip service will not give 
r9sults. The risks in co~~on stock inv~stm~nt have kept many investors 
f r om the field. As obvious as some of th9 ris~are, many persons f ind 
it impossible t o avoid them. As I sta.t':ld in the previous chapter, we have 
had in our nation, since the adv<:!nt of World War II, a generally hooming 
economy, and th"l returns of this 9xpanded national income have been going 
to those who 1vould dare the risks of equity investment. It ha. s offered 
an incentive, so to speak, to disregard former conservative positions. 
In so doing these investors have also assumed the .risks involved • . This 
is a s true f or those wha administer pension funds as it is for anyone else. 
Even in our era of prosperity, few portfolios can show only correct movgs. 
It is my contention that through the US8 of the safeguards I ~ill speak of, 
that it is ev•:m possible for some funds to show better than aver age r9 sul ts. 
Naturally t he time periods used, the amoun t of funds available and other con-
sider~tion s woul d pl ay a part. If even in our present prosperity it is 
mo s t difficult to get satisfactory resul ts, what will it b-9 l ike in the 
face of a declining market? It is, therefore, necessary at al.l tlmes to 
keep risk f~ctors to a minimum. Wha t ar~ these factors and considerations 




Firs t of all, it is necessary to develop a consistent policy, 
~~d a mind of one's own.* Th8 psychological risk is a hazard brought on 
by following t he crowd. It is not just the inexperienced investor tha t is 
subject to this. Even the large inves·tment trust firms have this h..<t.bi t. 
They claim that careful analysis tells them that a particular stock is 
a good buy, and that the higher it goes the surer they are. The basic 
analysis mi ~ht have been true enough, but they forget one importaDt 
f actor - the price they are payin g for the security. In order to handle 
a pension fund or any fund with success, it is necessary to be able to 
move a gainst the grain of what most people consider the right thing to do. 
The best approach is to look for particular securities that fit 
the need of the portfolio, whether it is basically an income security, or 
one that looks good for capit~l appreciation. Upon first glance, many 
securities may Se8ID to fit the bill, but a carefUl analysis should be 
made, with special consideration for future earnings and the 9rice to be 
paid. Once a security has passed the t gst on the basis of the above, it 
should be purchased. If the price shou1d f all, more shar':ls of that security 
should be bought. If it looked good at ten it showd be twice as good at 
five. Once it begins to move into mid stream do not try to swim aftl!lr 
it. It will look good, too good, but according t o the carefUl analysis 
prepared before purchase, it is not the value it used to be. After the 
future earnings have been discounted in the security, sell out and take 
the capital appr':lciation. In the case of income seeurities, the price 
is also important, oecause it shou!d yield an amount that makes a commitment 
-----·--~------------------------------------------------------------------*1, p. 4. 
in i t worth while. But such a security is not one that will t ake t he 
rid~ uphill. It is mor'3 a buy and hold proposition, so long a s it meets 
t h <:l needs of the portfolio. This does not mean that the mass of invest-
ors some day wi ll not get a hold of it and send it on its way. If t his 
shoul d happen, let it go, and after a run up, sell out. 
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Besides avoiding the hazard of mass psychology, through th<:! de-
velopment of a consistent policy of what constitutes value, and what securi-
ties are ov~r or under valued, there are other necessary precautions to take. 
No administrator or trustee group, can hope to know all the answer s, 
can hope to pick and choose only those securities that wil l act as they pre-
dict. Two or more competent persons, of course, are better than one, but 
the pr inciple of a diversified portf olio is valid in any case. For instance, 
diversificat,ion pl ays an important part in minimizing market risks. To 
be sure, the best way to ov~rcome this is by never being in a position 
where it i s necessary to sell a security in an adverse market, but should 
such a position occur, it is better to have diver sified. There might be 
some securities i n the portfolio that have fared better than av~rage. It 
is impossible for forced liquidation to occur under a plan where the obli-
gRtions of the fund will vary in proportion to its performance, but the 
many -oensions in force today are definitely subject to such risks. Even 
in the case of variable income plans, diversification is a protection 
against the performance of the fund showing unusually wide fluctuations, 
thus allowing it to approximate more nearly the market average. It is also 
a step in enabling th9 fund to show even better than markl3t performancl3. 
More shall be said of t his later. 
The prime r<:l~Snn for moving into th'3 fir:lld of equity invest-
ment, and away from a complete reliance on debt securities is to hedge 
against in.nation, either so that the employer could realize lower con-
tributions, or as in a few cases, to enable th~ r etired employee to be 
protected from its effects. Th'=!re is all too often a misconception on 
this score, how~ver. First, an ov'3r enthusiasm can push some security 
prices out of line consistent with their real worth, and the r ·eversal 
th~t inevitably comes about may catch investors off guard and cause the 
rash selling. 
Secondly, not every stock is going to perform well just be-
cause there is an i nflation. Take the soft drinks for i.nst.?nce. Their 
earnings suffered considerably and as investors found out, they proved 
to bl3 a poor inflation hedge. 
Wide diversification can help to overcome this, however. 
It will not make th8 stock behav'3 better, but it gives the inves tor a 
better chance to have picked enough of those that would act as desired. 
The difficulties presented by rash selling in the face of a deflation, 
are of course difficult to combat, but a diversified portfolio has more 
of a chance of coming off better, than one invested in a limited line 
of what the market considered ·.vere prime hedges. 
Ther~ is one other important function perform~d by a div9rsi-
fied portfolio, and that is the reduction in the credit risk. No on~ can 
guarantee financial success for any industry or firm vd thin an industry, 
for an indefinite period. There ar':l wide variations of quality, of course, 
and this factor can be reduced to an almost negligible amount. For ex-
ample, a fund could invest all its assets in American Telephon~ and 
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Telegraph and be assured that they are safe. Howev'3r, the r8turn her'9 
is limited to what Telephone is paying as a divid~d, with little hope 
of capital appreciation in the near future. The more appreciation de-
sired, the riskier credit wise must the investment be. So to get ad-
vantage of this appreciation and hold risk to a minimum, a wide diversi-
fication among industries is desirable. None of the s tocks in the port-
folio may ever go to zero, but better to have played safe and made som8-
thing than to have taken a long shot and lost all. 
Divl3rsification, of course, requires a sufficiently large fund 
to work with, something that small campanines and especially th8 newer 
plans do not have. The answer to diversification in such cases can be 
found in the use of investment companies. Many investment companies are 
making an a.ctive bid to be allowed to handle the funds of pension and 
other trusts by offering quantity discounts. Where the normal loading 
charge might have been eight percent, for larger purchases it might be 
reduced to t wo percent .* Not every such company will necessarily offer 
exactly what th"3 trustees are looking for as far as performance is con-
cerned, so thl'l selection of the proper company or companies is very im-
portant. The American Institute for Economic Research published the per-
formance histories of a consid~rable number of investment companies, and 
offers specific recomm<.!ndations. ThCJ yearly manual published by Arthur 
Wies-:Jnberger entitled In,v~stmo.n:!;,~~~es.a. is anoth'3r good source.** 
The third important factor tending to raduce th~ risks inh"lr<:!nt 
in common stock investmCJnt has to do with automatic timing of securi-ty 
----------------~---------~~~-~----------------------------------~--------
*15, p . 70. 
~'*15 ' p . 70. 
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purchases. Pension Funds are ideally suited to this mechanism becau se 
th~r~ is a continuous stream of contributions flo~dng into th~ f und . Dollar 
Cost Averaging, as such a program is called, d~mands that the investors 
t ake a. long rang<.~ point of view and do not abandon th~ plan on th~ do1J'm 
turn of the market cycle. It is just at this time when ·th9 plan is doing 
its most good. Price is the most important element in investment, and a 
dollar cos t averaging program can assur~ the investor of purch3.sing se-
curities at reasonabl8 prices on the average.* After a careful anal ysis, 
securities ar"! selected which the trust'3es feel will do the f-und the most 
good over th'3 long run, and they are faithfully pur chased, on a per iodic 
basis (monthly , quarterly), Rnd th~ fluctuations of the market are ignored. 
This pract ice need not be carried on only by those funds invest-
ing their assets directly in the market, but also it can be carried on 
through the purchase of inv'3stment company shares. As I stated before, 
investment companies want very much to get this sort of business and th'3 
best wav t o invest in an investment company, is on a dollar cost averagjng 
basis. 
Table II shows most clearly how a dollar aver'lging program can 
give a pension fund a very favorable cost position ov':lr the years. Ju s t 
by completely igno-ring the market a fund start'3d in the high market of t he 
t wenties could show in 1952 a capital gain of $153.00 per shar::! invest9d, 
or a ninety-one p<:lrcent appreciation over avers.ge cost. 
(See Ts.bl<3 II) 
*1' p . 355-:-------------- --------------------------------------------
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Thus; in conclusion it may b~ said of dolla r cost averaging: 
1) "It substitutes a mechanical objective plan, for subjective determina-
tion of when to buy and when to sell. 11 2) "It does not mattc;r at what 
point in the market the plan is initiated as long as it is followed con-
sistently as a long rang:J plan of capit9.l accumulation." 5) "At times 
the market value of the portfolio may decline below its cost, but th~ 
longer the plan is followed, the less lik'3ly this will happen."* 
None of the factors which I have mentioned, consistency, diversi-
fication, automatic timing, can displace good sound judgment and invest-
ment know how. They r a ther are an aid, or even a hedge against a mist.:lice 
in judgm8nt. Ther'3fore any company ""9lanning a pension program, should 
not only consider this new variable incom~ scheme and its benefits, but 
also the ramif ications of investment in common stock which is the; heart 
68 
of the program. To be sure, this type of plan cannot be forced into liquida-
tion, but it has more of a function than to exist. It is intend~d that it 
should offer the retired employee a relatively stable real income, and all 
the sense of security th9.t comes with such protection. Therefore, it is 
the duty of the trustees to mru{e the fund provide for this. The several 
safeguards mentioned, should by all means be incorporated as policy, but 
beyond this , co~petent inves tment ability is nc;ed'3d on the trustee board. 
In many cases h<:!retofonj banks a..nd insurance comnanies ha'Te performed the 
inves tment duties, and I feel that they should continue this functioB, but 
with a new outlook, the outlook required by th~ variable income pension pro-
gram. Some companies may wish to let one or more of their officers act as 
-~-~~------·-----------------------------------------------------
*18, p. 559. 
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truste~s, or maybe it will be a joint manag~ment -union board. In ~ith~r 
case, unless th~ trustees have th~ tim~ and the ability for the t ask , in-
vestm~nt advice from the outside should be brought in for advisory purposes. 
The trust department of a bank might act in such a capacity, or perhaps 
a private i nvestment counseling firm. 
CH.APTID. IX 
PUTTING THE IDEA TO WORK 
In the preceding chapters I h9.ve pointed out why we should make 
a greater use of equity securities in pension por tfolios, and how their 
gr~ater use means we would also change our concept of benefits to be paid 
out of the s·~ plans. I pointed out the risks involved i n e ui ty invest-
ment and th~ manners in which th~ may be held to a minimum. I also men-
tioned how it might be possible for these pension funds to demonstrate 
better than market average results. Here, in conclusion, I wi ll offer 
briefly t wo plans dev~loped specifically for the purpose of providing 
a sounder pension progr~ throu gh a sound method of employing common 
stock. 
The f irst one I will refer t o is a program developed by 
C. R. HP.nderson, a New York attorney, and the second is the program 
devised by the Teachers Insurance Company and Annuity Association, as 
proposed by Will iam C. Greenough, vice president. 
First of all let us look at Mr. Henderson's proposal s .* This 
program is dr avm up as mentioned, the i dea of putting the higher yield 
of colillDon stocks to good use , and discards the previous attempts a t in-
flation hedging by deto:lrmining benefits on a final earnings basis. 
Mr. Hendr:? rson' s plan wouJ.d have the benefit formula based on average 
earnings and alleviate the problems of fixed dollar benefits by putting 
only t vro-thirds or thrf9e-four ths of the retirement money into a conventional 
----~~·------------· --------·------·-·---------------
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retirement plan, with the r emainder going i nto a common stock annui ty 
system. 
The convent ional part of the program woul d provide r'3tirement 
benefits equal to a prescribed percentagf3 of the employees pa.y for each 
year he participat~d in thf3 p~an. The benefits woul d be f orthcoming from 
a f unded pensi on trust or group annuity contract. The employ'3e ·:ould 
know each year, just how much retirem<:!nt income he could exoect on the 
basis of the work he did that year. The ':lmployer woul d also know with 
reasonable cert~inty the cost to him and could charge it to the cost of 
goods sold in that year. 
The common stock part of t he program woul d be handled in a new 
and let us say unconventional manner. This portion of the pl an is faced 
with the pr oblem of distributing a fluctuating fund to an empl oyee over 
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the period he lives after retirement. Market fluctuations make it impossible 
to determine a dollar annuity, and furth':lrmore it is not the intention of 
the program that this portion of the program be handled in such terms. 
Howard · Hennington, a Fellow of the Society of Actuaries, has , however, 
dev~loped a system which fits perfectly the needs of this equity part of 
the .fund. 
A system of annuities woul d be set up in which contributions 
to the fund, and benef its paid out woul d be measured in terms of "Trust 
Units", simile.r to the idea of shares in a mutual fund. As a basi s upon 
which to make actuarial as sumptions, an investment yi~ld of four per cent 
i s assum13d ( a conservative f igure) as well as the mortality predictions 
of the 1937 Standard Mortality Table set back t wo years. 
The employee pays over to the trust fund an amount equal to 
a certain percent of each pay check, and the employee is credited with 
a certain number of retirement units. ThC?. value of the 11 retirement 
units" to hich an ~mploy'=!c:! is entitled, will depend on when the con-
tribution was made, his sex, and also the current value of the Trust 
Units. The current value of the Trust Units. is, of course, determined 
by the:! total value of the fund divided by the number of Trust Units 
outstanding. Now the number of these units outstanding will be equal 
to a scale, the rev~rse of that found in Table III. Thus for each male 
thirty years of age 'With 5.502 Retirement Units to his credit, ther e 
will be on e Trust Unit. These same retir~ment units at age sixty-five 
will equal 5. '302 trust units. An employee can figure how large a fund 
has been credited to him by multiplying the number of retirement units 
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he has earned by the current value of the trust units to his credit. Th.e 
amount he will actually receive upon his retirgment, to be paid in quarter-
ly inst .~llment, would depend on the number of retirement units to his 
credit, the current value of a trust unit a s it fluctuates from quarter 
t o quarter, and a prescribed percentage which was determined for his sex 
and age at the time of retirement. A male, age sixty-five at retirement 
would receive an amount equal to nine percent of the value of the trust 
units to his credit. 
Table III 
Numb~r of R19tirement Units Credited to 
An Employ~e for a Contribution Equaling 
One Trust Unit* 
Age of Employee At 
Femal~ Date of Contribution Male 
50 5.502 4.8M 
55 4.315 5.942 
40 5.492 5.206 
45 2.808 2.596 
50 2.255 2.087 
55 1.755 1.662 
60 1.545 1.505 
85 1.000 1.000 
The valu~ of a trust unit will remain level so long the actual 
mortality rate follows the anticipated r ate, and so long as four p~rcent 
return on th~ fUnd (including appreciation and d'!lpr~ciation) can be earned 
and compounded annually. If either fluctuates, the value of the Trust 
Unit will go up or down accordingly . Whether it actually ':lams more or 
less than f our percent is of no real concern to the plan. The purpose 
of the assumption is merely to adjust the r~lative rights of differgnt 
amployees according to age. Chances are that the fund over the lon g run 
wi l l show better than a four percent return. 
It was mentioned before that the payments to the ben eficiaries 
would be made on a quart'!lrly basis. The rea;3 ons for t his are th'lt in the 
first place it makes administration ea 2ier. Both the contributions and 
retirement payments, as well as the valuations for determination of con-
trihutions and retirement benefits would be made at that time. Secondly, 
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ther 17 is another advantage to be gained from quarterly paym~nts . The 
f a ct that the b'3neficiary receives them a t differ '3nt times tha..n th~ 
regular annuity payments and social security, will help to point ou t 
to him that the colil!llon stock paym<?nts will vary in amount from tim<? to 
time. 
This simply is the plan proposed by c. R. H~=.!nderson . There 
are other problems not discussed here, such as, the question of employees' 
contribution, random i n cid'3nc<? of mortality in a small group, paymen t of 
vest '3d rights upon separ:'l.tion from the company's employ, ves ting past 
ser vice benefits as well as distribution or termination of the plan and 
probl~ms pres'3nted by conversion from a conventional plan to this new 
program. For an explanatinn of how they are handled, I refer the reader 
to c. R. B•:md.::lr son' s article in the Harvard Busin~ss Re!i~Yr.!. 
The key to the investmsnt of th'3 funds gathered undgr such a 
program was presented i n the previous chapter in th'3 discussion on the 
minimization of risk s in common stock i nvestmcant. The need to f ollow the 
principles stated ther~ cannot be emphasized too much. A sound and con-
sist'3nt poliGY is always a prerequisite for success. 
Now to look into the program as developed by the Teachers In-
surance and Annuity Associa tion. This Associa t i on had its origin in a 
b equ est by Andrew Carne gie. In 1905 he g~?.ve ten mill ion dollars to estab-
lish free p!'IDsion s for college professors. In 1918 th8 Carnegie Founda-
tion for the advancement of Teadhing and the Carnegie Corporation of New 
York established wh.'3.t is now the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association 
of America. A contributory annuity system was inaugurated, with fixed 
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dollar b enefits guaranteed. The adm1nistrators of the Association took 
no tic~ of the plight in which the recipi"'!nts of their annuities were 
fLnding themselves and decided to look into the possibility of altering 
t his condition.~~ 
Under the new plan a separate corporation was to be s et un, with 
coordinated control at the top level. The original corporation will con-
tinue to oper ate as a legal reserve life insuranc<:J company and continue to 
offer the conventional annuity contract.** 
The new part of the program, which cannot be credited with more 
t han f ifty percent of any individual's total premium, will undertake the 
investment of common stock. It is a.s th'3 T.I. A. A. firmly point out, 11 ••• a 
long term Lnvestment program, not a speculative devic'3. "*** Let us look 
more closely at just h w this program will op!3rate.**** 
The partici pant in theequities fund will have a fully vested 
contract, so that he may s~~teh jobs and take his accumulat ion ith him 
also. Also, no loan or cash values wou l d be established on th'3 contracts 
so that th~y will not be used for anything but their intended purpose . 
This same pr h!ciple is applied to the program devised by C. R. Hender son . 
It not only as sures that the recipient does not act fooli shly in the short 
run, but t&~t there will never be any unexpected, liquidations forced upon 
the fund. 
Each premium paid to the equiti"'!s f und would purchase a ~ertain 
number of units, repres enting th"'! participant's share in the fund. The 
numb er of units each premium woul d purchase will vary with the curr ent 
val ue of each unit. He would also receive periodically an additional 
*9' pp. s-:g:-----------------------·----------------------------------
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numb ~r of units arising from th~ funds dividend incom~. In the program 
discussed previously, dividends and principal would not be s~parat~d 
and shares i n the fund woul d reflect the combin~d valu~ of the t vro. This 
program developed by the T.I.A.A. amounts to the sam~ in the end, however. 
The retirement b~efits are, of course, not tied to fixed 
dollar amounts, but ar~ determined by the number of units that hav~ ac-
crued to the participant. Th9 actual computation would be similar to 
those in determining the conventional dollar annuity, but instead of 
dollars, units are figured. The income of th~ recipient will receive 
will vary ~ith the current value of the common stock behind it, and the 
dividends it is yielding. Thus if the value of a unit were $1.00 and the 
holder had 1000 units to his credit, he would rec.eive $1,000 as income 
from his equity fund. 
How would such a system protect the policy hold,n· against rises 
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in the price level? The basic argument was presented il1 a pr~vious chapter, 
but once mor~ I will offer a chart as drawn up by the T .I. A.A., to demon-
strate that this is the only way really to off'3r the r~tiring person a h13dge 
against i nflation. Of course, this is all in retrospect, but then, it is 
the only means available to show what can be done. 
Chart V 
The combln~d annuity is the ne'V program th..~t I h9.V':l beo:m de-
scribing. Its advantage ov~r the fixed annuity is obvious. The r~sults 
are similar to th~ one i n the previous chart and the deviations are the 
result of different lndexes used. 
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Thus i n this chapter I h9.ve pres~IDted t wo programs, basically 
V9ry similar: one developed by an insurance company, the other by a private 
individual for the US'9 of coroorations that have a Pension Trust Program, 
or that have an insured annuity plan and wish to add a pension trust plan 
which will be inv~sted in equity funds. What I am trying to point out here 
is that the safe and sound development of equity securi~ies ln p<:lnsion funds 
can be developed by any one of the thr~e general classifications of admin-
istrators: company administrators, insuranct:l companies, or bank trust de-
partments. The latter usually work i n conjunction with the company admin-
istrators, and until now there have been no banks that h-'ive a vari able in-
come pension program drawn up and available to offer to customers who come 
to them for advice L~ the adoption of a pension plan. The demand must 
naturally come from the companies thems,'llves , and until now it i s not 
present, but I feel that variable lncome plans should be drawn up by banks, 
insuranc~ compani~s and private pension counseling firms to meet the 1emand 
that will dev"llop ln the future. 
CHAPTER :I 
CONCLUDING R~S 
The aim of this thesis was to point out how common stock in-
vestment could give a new vitality to our pres~t privat~ p~nsion progr~s. 
As I have pointed out, there has be !3n a mov~ toward a. greater inclu sion of 
equity securiti~s in p~sion fund portfolios, and I hop~ I have made it clear 
to the reader that a.s our programs are now c nstituted, th!!re is a dang'3r 
in this movem'3nt. We must revamp our thinking and expand this new concept 
of variable income pensions, if common stock inv9stm'3nt is going to be ex-
ploited fully and safely. 
Before I draw this paper to a close I wish to comment on some 
possible revitalization that the fUll development of such programs might 
give to our economy. This revitalization will aris'3 out of the results 
t~~t a greater demand for common stock will bring about. If our pensions 
are geared for common stock investment, the demand they have put on the 
mark~t will continue to increase. Now there are some investors who favor 
the over-the-counter market and some who prefer the organized exchanges. 
The advantage of the latter is, of course, a free and ready mark~t, adding 
liquidlty to the securities traded through it. Trustees handling pension 
funds shoul d seek out the listed exch~ges for this r'3ason whenever possible. 
Such securities as bank stocks ar'3 only handled in the ov'3r-the-counter 
market, so if they are to be included in the portfolio it will, of course, 
be necessary to deal in t his market. For the most part, the increased 
volume should and will go toward the organized exchanges and especially the 
two New York exchanges. 
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These organized New York markets have fulfilled the prerequi-
sites of a good market in th~ past, that is, transactions can be effected 
quickly, they actually take place frequently, price fluctuations between 
transactions are not wide, and the usual spread betwe~ bid and asked 
prices are not wide.* A greater volume of busines.s of the nature that 
pension funds will offer, will add to this. More active demand will re-
sult in a greater frequency of transactions and will tend to narrow the 
spreads in prices betwe~n sales. Furthermore, the constant demand that 
pension funds will put on the market will tend to create a more orderly 
market, over the long run. Speculative surges or collapses might well be 
minimized. But this demand by pension funds will have effects beyond the 
stock market. 
As the market activity increases, it is only natural that cor-
porate financial officers will take note .of it. If it is the policy of 
the corporation to get a broad and active market for their securities they 
might well ask to be listed on the exchange. As their security becomes 
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more well known and becomes seasoned, the market for it will broaden, and 
make subsequent security floatations easier and less expensive. The pension 
funds are going to be looking for more and more common stock, and this 
portion of the corporate capit9.lization is going to be easier to float. 
Ainerican industry in the post war era has not be<:ln particularly 
concerned over the lack of demand for equity securities. To be sur~, there 
have been some voices heard, but the common comment of today's executive 
has been that you cannot afford to go into debt. It is an unfortunate 
-----------------------------------------------·------*1, p. 223. 
attitude, but unfortunately it has also proved very true. With ta.xes at 
high levels, debt pres'9Ilts a way of financing expansion at the expense of 
the government. 
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Bow sound this policy will prove to be over the long run is v~ry 
doubtful. All we have to do is turn back the pages of history to the era 
of the 1950's. Take a look at what happened to the railroads when business 
fell off. Thelr fixed charges drove a third of the class I roads into re-
CC!dvership. This is a poor position for the management and the owners to 
.find themselves. They can well find themselves without jobs, or without 
equity 1n short order. This not only increases the credit risk in security 
investment, but also has important effects to the whole economy. It is more 
difficult for companies to get back on their feet, into the black and out 
of the red, when they are burdened with much unavoidable expense. 
Just because the pension funds may be buying more common stock,- , it 
does not meBn that they alone are going to bring about a change in the capi-
talization habits our corporations have developed over the last decade. They 
will make up part of a demand, however, and make an important contribution 
to that end. The corporations are in the long run, going to sell the se-
curities that the investing public demands. If the demand is for common 
stock, a change in that direction will be made. This will be an lmportant 
contribution to · the economy, in that the rigidity of costs that interest 
payments represent, will be done away with. ~ economy based on soundly 
financed business is in that much petter a position to meet a decline in 
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